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CONSTRUCTING A FINANCIAL




"The role of the financial system in a developing country is critical to
supporting the overall development process. "
-Rumu Sarkarl
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article will first examine the regulatory context against which
any financial integration model for the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) has to be devised. Second, it will examine the Draft
CARICOM Financial Services Agreement (CFSA)2 to determine
whether it provides a sufficient foundation upon which an integrated fi-
nancial market could be established. This will involve evaluating the
CFSA by reference to general principles as well as more detailed provi-
sions in other financial regulatory models. Third, the article will identify
the core elements that would have to be considered in preparing drafting
instructions (Outline Drafting Instructions) for a proposed and more
comprehensive alternative agreement, as well as supporting legislation to
establish an Integrated CARICOM Financial Sector (ICFS). 3 The Out-
line Drafting Instructions should become useful to relevant policymakers
and ultimately serve an important role in the overall development pro-
cess. They will emphasize policy considerations, require outline details
that would have to be included in an appropriate financial integration
model for CARICOM, and could be easily adapted for implementation
under the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).
*Christopher P. Malcolm, LL.B. (University of the West Indies), LL.M. - Banking
& Finance, Ph.D. (London), MCIArb. Attorney-at-Law (Jamaica, Dominica, Brit-
ish Virgin Islands, St. Lucia) E-mail: chris@malcolmgordonlaw.com.
1. Rumu Sarkar, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 229 (J.J. Nor-
ton ed., Kluwer Law Int'l 1999).
2. See generally Second Draft CARICOM Financial Services Agreement (CFSA)
dated November 2004; prepared by Economic Intelligence and Policy Unit, CAR-
ICOM Secretariat.
3. The Outline Drafting Instructions are located in section VIII of this article - Ele-
ments to be Considered in Preparing Drafting Instructions for an Agreement and
Supporting Legislation to Establish an Integrated CARICOM Financial Sector
[hereinafter Annex].
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II. CONTEXT
There are essentially five distinct financial regulatory regimes in the
Commonwealth Caribbean: 1) Barbados, 2) Guyana, 3) Jamaica, 4) Trini-
dad and Tobago, and 5) the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS). In a jurisdictional sense, however, the OECS arrangement com-
prises seven independent States under a monetary union: 1) Antigua and
Barbuda, 2) the Commonwealth of Dominica, 3) Grenada, 4) Montserrat,
5) St. Christopher (St. Kitts) and Nevis, 6) St. Lucia, and 7) St. Vincent
and the Grenadines (the Member States). 4 While each OECS Member
State could be considered as a distinct regulatory regime, they have all
implemented uniform financial laws, and the Eastern Caribbean Central
Bank (ECCB) is their common financial regulator and supervisor. 5
This paper will consider the financial systems in Jamaica and the
OECS. The Jamaican system has undergone recent and fundamental re-
forms, and the regulatory principles incorporated there could be instruc-
tive. The OECS system already involves several Member States of
CARICOM and has incorporated principles that could become important
in devising a relevant financial integration model. Nevertheless, it is an-
ticipated that before the implementation of any new and comprehensive
CARICOM financial model, the policymakers will examine the remain-
ing jurisdictions to ensure that relevant inputs from them are also
included.
III. FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN JAMAICA
The regulation of the Jamaican financial sector is carried out by the
Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) and the Financial Services Commission (FSC).
The BOJ was established under the Bank of Jamaica Act: "To influence
the volume and condition of supply of credit so as to promote the fullest
expansion in production, trade and employment, consistent with the
maintenance of monetary stability in Jamaica ... [and] to foster the de-
velopment of money and capital markets in Jamaica and to act as banker
to the Government."'6 The BOJ has been authorized to examine "com-
mercial banks and specified [financial] institutions."' 7 The FSC was estab-
lished under section 3 of the Financial Services Commission Act (FSCA).
It is responsible for the regulation and supervision of other prescribed
financial institutions.8
4. See generally Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act, July 5, 1983, avail-
able at http://www.eccb-centralbank.org/PDF/bank-agreementl983.pdf.
5. See Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), http://www.eccb-centralbank.org/
About/who-we-are.asp
6. See Bank of Jamaica Act, 1960, § 5, available at http://www.caricomlaw.org/docs/
the.%20Bank%20of&20Jamaica%20Act.pdf.
7. Id.§2.
8. See Financial Services Commission Act (FSCA), 2001, § 6 (1) (Jam.), available at
http://www.caricomlaw.orgldocslFinancial%20Services%20Commission%2OAct.
pdf. FSCA, section 2, provides, "[a] 'prescribed financial institution' means an
institution or person offering or providing financial services to the public." The
definition of "prescribed financial institution" is not very helpful. But section 2
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A. FINANCIAL LAWS
As statutory creatures, the BOJ and FSC derive their authority under
relevant legislation. Such legislation includes: the Banking Act, the Fi-
nancial Institutions Act, the Building Societies Act, the Insurance Act,
the Securities Act, and the Unit Trusts Act.
1. Banking Act
Section 2 (1) of the Banking Act provides that "[a] 'bank' means any
company licensed under this Act to carry on banking business." 9 Banks
are supervised by the BOJ through the Department of Supervision of
Banks and Financial Institutions (DSBFI). t0 This authority is under sec-
tion 29 (1), which provides that "[t]he Bank of Jamaica is responsible for
the supervision of banks.""
The BOJ has extensive supervisory authority under Part IX of the
Banking Act. The BOJ shall, at least once in each year, examine the
affairs of each bank to ensure that the provisions of the Banking Act are
being complied with and that the bank is in a sound financial position. 12
It also has wide powers of inspection under the provisions of the Banking
Act. These provisions require the BOJ to ensure that banking proce-
dures are adequate for protection of depositors and shareholders. 13
2. Financial Institutions Act
Section 1 (2) of the Financial Institutions Act (FIA) establishes a cate-
gory of institutions over which the FIA shall not apply. To carry out the
business of deposit taking in Jamaica, a financial institution that is not
registered under one of the legislation prescribed in section 1 (2) must be
licensed under the FIA. 14 Licensed financial institutions are then subject
to supervision under section 29 (1), which provides that "The Bank of
also provides that "financial services means services provided or offered in connec-
tion with - (a) insurance; (b) the acquisition or disposal of - (i) securities within
the meaning of the Securities Act; (ii) units under a registered unit trust scheme
within the meaning of the Unit Trust Act; (c) such other services as the Minister
may by order declare to be financial services for the purposes of this Act." Al-
though the Act contemplates non-deposit taking institutions, the Minister may by
order declare that deposit taking institutions are subject to its operation.
9. See Banking Act, 1992, § 2 (1) (Jam.), available at http://www.caricomlaw.org/docs/
The%20Banking%20Act.pdf. Section 2(1) defines "banking business" as, "the
business of receiving from the public, on current account or deposit account,
money which is repayable on demand by cheque or order and which may be in-
vested by way of advances to customers or otherwise; and such business of a like
nature as the Minister may, by order, prescribe."
10. See Bank of Jamaica Act, § 34A (1).
11. Banking Act, § 29 (1).
12. See id. § 29 (2)(c).
13. Id. § 30; see also § 29A (2)(i).
14. See Financial Institutions Act (FIA), Part IX (Jam.), available at http://www.car-
icomlaw.org/docs/Financial%201nstitutions%2OAct.pdf. The statute includes sec-
tion 29(1) and is essentially a verbatim reproduction of Part IX of the Banking
Act. Under that part of the FIA, the powers conferred on the BOJ are identical to
those conferred under Part IX of the Banking Act.
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Jamaica is responsible for the supervision of licensees. ' 15 This is con-
ducted through the DSBFI.16
3. Building Societies Act
Section 3 of the Building Societies Act states the formal requirements
for the establishment of a building society in Jamaica. Although it does
not define a building society, section 4 of the Building Societies Act de-
termines the basis on which a Jamaican building society must operate.17
The BOJ has not been conferred with supervisory authority under the
Building Societies Act. Nevertheless, it has implicit authority to super-
vise building societies under the Bank of Jamaica (Building Societies)
Regulations, 1995. This authority is found in regulations 7 and 10. Fur-
ther, regulation 12 provides that: "Until a society has complied with regu-
lations 7 and 10 it shall be subject to such conditions to ensure prudent
management as the Bank may determine, with the approval of the
Minister." 18
4. Insurance Act
Unless a contrary intention is expressed in the Act itself, the Insurance
Act applies to all insurance intermediaries and all insurers, whether es-
tablished in or outside of Jamaica that carry on insurance business in Ja-
maica. t9 Whereas a specialist insurance supervisor was responsible for
supervising insurance entities under the Insurance Act, 1971, the 2001
Act confers regulatory and supervisory authority on the FSC.20 Since the
FSC is responsible for regulation of all non-deposit taking institutions in
Jamaica, it cannot therefore be considered as a specialist insurance
regulator.
The FSC has been authorized to make regulations for the insurance
sector. This is confirmed under section 144 (1) of the Insurance Act,
which provides that: "The Commission may, with the approval of the
Minister, make regulations providing for such matters as may be neces-
sary or expedient for the purposes of this Act .... ,,21 In exercise of this
power, the FSC has adopted the Insurance Regulations 2001, which de-
scribe the procedural requirements for the conduct of business in the
15. See id. Section 2(1) defines a "licence" as "a licence granted under this Act".
16. See Bank of Jamaica Act, § 34A (1).
17. See Building Societies Act, 1997 (Jam.), available at http://www.caricomlaw.org/
docs/The%20Building%20Societies%2OAct.pdf. Section 4 (2)(b) provides, "The
rules of every building society shall set forth . .. the purpose to which the funds of
the society are to be applied, and the manner in which they are to be invested."
18. Id.
19. See Insurance Act, 2001 (Jam.), (repealing the Insurance Act, 1971), available at
http://www.caricomlaw.org/docs' he%201nsurance%2OAct.pdf. Section 3 (1) in-
cludes a non-exhaustive list of the classes of insurance business covered by the Act.
20. Id. Section 4 provides, "The Commission [FSCJ shall be responsible for the ad-
ministration of this Act." Parts II-VIII of the Insurance Act delimit the substan-
tive requirements for the insurance sector and the powers of the FSC.
21. Id. § 144 (1).
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Jamaican insurance sector.22
5. Securities Act
Section 5 (1)(a) of the Securities Act provides: "The functions of the
Commission shall be - to regulate the securities industry in accordance
with this Act and to ensure that appropriate standards of conduct and
performance are maintained in the industry in accordance with this Act
on (sic) any rules or regulations made hereunder. ' 23 For these purposes,
"[a] 'Commission' means the Financial Services Commission established
under section 3 of the Financial Services Commission Act." 24
Parts II-VII of the Securities Act establish the powers of the FSC. In
particular, section 76 (1)(a) provides: "The Commission may, with the
approval of the Minister, make regulations-(a) regulating the issue of
and dealings in securities and the records relating thereto. ' 25 No regula-
tions have been made in exercise of the powers conferred under section
76 of the Securities Act.
The FSC has been conferred with extensive powers of investigation
under section 68 of the Securities Act. Further, section 13 of the Act
requires the issuer of securities to register with the FSC in a prescribed
form. In this role, the FSC has published non-exhaustive guidelines re-
quiring the "issuer [of securities] to provide detailed information about
itself to the Commission and to the investing public. These requirements
are geared to protect investors by promoting full and fair disclosure of
information. 26
6. Unit Trusts Act
Section 3 of the Unit Trusts (Amendment) Act 2001 provides: "[the]
'Commission' means the Financial Services Commission established
under section 3 of the Financial Services Commission Act."'27 The FSC is
responsible for general administration of this Act. Under section 28:
"[t]he Commission may, with the approval of the Minister, make regula-
tions for the better carrying out of the provisions of this Act . . . ." Sec-
tion 5 requires the registration of all unit trusts with the FSC and it may
impose such disclosure or other requirements as it deems fit for the pro-
tection of investors. 28
22. The Insurance Regulations, 2001, are contained in Vol. CXXIV, No. 119 of Dec.
31, 2001.
23. See Securities Act, 1993 (Jam.), amended by Securities Act, Act 8 of 2001.
24. Id. § 2 (1).
25. Id. § 76(1)(a).
26. See generally FIN. SERV. COMM'N, GUIDELINES FOR ISSUERS OF SECURITIES, avail-
able at http://www.fscjamaica.org/download-file.php?filename=documents/sec-
tions/Guidelines% 20to%20Issuers%20of%20Securities.pdL
27. See Unit Trusts Act, 1971 (Jam.), available at http://www.caricomlaw.org/docs/Unit
%20Trusts%20Act.pdf.
28. See id. § 5 (1)(d),(e).
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B. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The framework for the regulation and supervision of the Jamaican fi-
nancial sector includes two recognized regulatory agencies and an over-
sight body. The recognized regulatory agencies are the BOJ and the FSC
and the oversight body is the Financial Regulatory Council (FRC).29 The
FRC has been conferred with the authority to coordinate the regulatory
and supervisory activities of the BOJ and the FSC.30
The Jamaica Deposit Insurance Corporation (JDIC) was established in
1998.31 It also serves an integral role in the Jamaican financial sector and
has been authorized to maintain deposit insurance for prescribed finan-
cial institutions.32 The JDIC complements the BOJ, which is authorized
to regulate deposit taking institutions33 and the FSC, which is authorized
to regulate and supervise non-deposit taking institutions.34
1. Financial Services Commission
The FSC was introduced as part of an overall strategy to foster investor
confidence and to strengthen the framework for financial regulation in
Jamaica. 35 It is based on a novel consolidated approach to financial sec-
tor regulation and supervision.36 Nevertheless, the FSC has not been
conferred with the authority to regulate the entire Jamaican financial sec-
tor. This is anomalous because the FSC was a response to regulatory
failures and subsequent financial sector collapse in Jamaica during the
1990s and reasons given for its establishment favor a single regulator.37
The General Duties and Powers of the FSC are set out in sections 6-9
of the Financial Services Commission Act. Section 6 (1)(a) states that it
has been established for "the purpose of protecting customers of financial
29. The FRC was established in 2000 and is chaired by the Governor of the BOJ or his
nominee.
30. Id.
31. See Deposit Insurance Act, 1998, § 3 (1) (Jam.), available at http://www.caricom-
law.org/docs[The%20Deposit%201nsurance%2OAct.pdf.
32. Id. § 2 (1).
33. See Bank of Jamaica Act, 34A (1).
34. See Financial Services Commission Act, § 2 (1).
35. See generally Kenneth Rattray, Chairman, Fin. Sector Adjustment Co., Remarks
on FINSAC's 2001 Annual Report, available at http://www.finsac.com/publica-
tions/report2001/index.html.
36. See generally Celia Blake, Under One Roof: Integrated Regulator for Non-Deposit
Taking Financial Institutions in Jamaica, 6 Caribbean. L. Bull. 1 (2002). The ap-
proach is considered novel, not in a general sense, but because it is new to the
Commonwealth Caribbean.
37. Id.; see generally Brian Wynter, Submission To The Committee Debates On The
Financial Bills (Nov. 9, 2000), available at Gordon House, Kingston, Jam.; see also
Gayon Hosin, Div. Chief, Bank of Jam., Speech Delivered at the Banking on
Safety Seminars at Kingston, Jam.:Regulatory Convergence - A Must for Financial
Sector Safety, (July 22, 1999) available at http://www.jdic.org/egulatory
covenrgence.htm. . The reasons stated by Hosin are also reflected in the submis-
sion of Wynter to the Committee Debates. According to Wynter, "[the FSC]
would present an opportunity to create common standards and importantly, it
would facilitate the reduction of duplication caused by many different regulators
imposing separate standards on - in some cases - a single entity."
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services38 the Commission shall supervise and regulate prescribed finan-
cial institutions. 3
9
2. Bank of Jamaica
Section 34F (1) of the Bank of Jamaica Act provides: "[t]he Minister
may, in accordance with the recommendations of the Bank, make regula-
tions prescribing prudential criteria and minimum solvency standards to
be complied with by commercial banks and specified financial institu-
tions."' 40 The relevant institutions would have been established under
specific legislation governing the legal and policy parameters for their li-
censing, supervision, and operation. The principal legislative acts are the
Bank of Jamaica Act, the Banking Act, the Financial Institutions Act, and
the Building Societies Act.4 1 The BOJ also relies on the Bank of Jamaica
(Building Societies) Regulations, 1995 and the Banking (Capital Base)
Regulations, 1997.42
3. Jamaica Deposit Insurance Corporation
The Jamaica Deposit Insurance Corporation (JDIC) was established
under section 3 (1) of the Deposit Insurance Act 1998. Part II of the Act
establishes the objects and functions of the JDIC. The JDIC is there au-
thorized to establish and manage a deposit insurance scheme for protec-
tion of deposits43 with prescribed financial institutions.44 It is also
required to monitor the affairs of these prescribed financial institutions.45
The JDIC has been authorized to share financial and other information
with the BOJ and the FSC. 4 6 By this mechanism, the JDIC could be con-
38. See Financial Services Commission Act, § 2. Under the act, "financial services"
are "services provided or offered in connection with - (a) insurance; (b) the acqui-
sition or disposal of - (i) securities within the meaning of the Securities Act; (ii)
units under a registered unit trust scheme within the meaning of the Unit Trusts
Act; (c) such other services as the Minister may by order declare to be financial
services for the purposes of this Act."
39. Id. A "prescribed financial institution" is "an institution or person offering or pro-
viding financial services to the public."
40. See Bank of Jamaica Act. Section 34F (2) includes a non-exhaustive list of regula-
tions that may be made under section 34F (1).
41. Id.; see also Banking Act; Financial Institutions Act; and Building Societies Act.
42. See generally Bank of Jamaica, Legislation, available at http://www.boj.org.jm/su-
pervised-legislation.php.
43. See Deposit Insurance Act. Section 2 (1) provides a definition for "deposit" that is
similar to the definition in the Banking Act, the Financial Institutions Act and the
Bank Of Jamaica (Building Societies) Regulations, 1995. An "insured deposit"
under section 18 of the Deposit Insurance Act is a maximum of J$300,000 per
depositor per institution.
44. Id. Section 2 (1) defines a "financial institution" as "(a) a bank licensed under the
Banking Act or a financial institution licensed under the Financial Institutions Act;
(b) a building society licensed under the Building Societies Act; or (c) subject to
subsection (3), any other person or undertaking whose business includes the ac-
cepting of deposits and who has been declared by the Minister under section 2 of
the Bank of Jamaica Act to be a specified financial institution."
45. Id. § 5.
46. Id.§7.
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sidered to have a critical and complementary role in the regulation and
supervision of the Jamaican financial sector.
4. Financial Regulatory Council
The Financial Regulatory Council (FRC) was established under a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).4 7 The FRC is:
A high level inter-regulatory agency which was established in 2000
with the mandate to develop policies and strategies to facilitate
greater co-ordination and information sharing between (sic) the vari-
ous supervisory agencies operating in the Jamaican financial sec-
tor .... The MOU addresses issues including information sharing,
lead regulator and the conduct of co-ordinated examinations for du-
ally licensed entities. 48
The FRC provides a mechanism through which the distinct regulatory
agencies are able to coordinate their activities.49 It also enables the ongo-
ing participation of central government in the regulation and supervision
of the entire Jamaican financial sector.50 While this would not have been
intended, the FRC could conceivably be considered to be a single or um-
brella financial regulator for Jamaica with the BOJ and FSC as its agents.
C. OVERVIEW OF A FINANCIAL CRISIS
Prior to the 1970s, the Jamaican financial sector was dominated by for-
eign banks and insurance companies. Local investment in the sector was
limited and there was significant reliance on self regulation. Relevant
standards were determined by individual institutions and applied on the
bases agreed in their home country. 51
During the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, many of the foreign banks
and other financial institutions then operating in Jamaica were national-
ized.52 There was also a global oil crisis in the 1970s that resulted in dra-
matic increases in the cost to Jamaica of imported goods and services.
This led to an economic crisis and the commencement of a borrowing
47. See generally Bank of Jamaica Act; Banking Act; Financial Institutions Act; and
Building Societies Act.
48. Id.
49. See Bank of Jamaica Act, § 34D; see also Financial Services Commission Act, § 16;
Deposit Insurance Act, § 7. Those sections authorize regulatory coordination and
information sharing. See also Banking Act, supra note 9, at § 45; Financial Institu-
tions Act, supra note 14, at § 44; Bank of Jamaica (Building Societies) Regulations,
1995 reg. 44.
50. The Financial Secretary, the chief civil servant in the Ministry of Finance and Plan-
ning, is represented at the FRC.
51. See FIN. SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CO. (FINSAC), ANNUAL REPORT: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND (1998) available at http:/www.finsac.com/publications/annualreport
98/historicalbackground.htm [hereinafter FINSAC Annual Report].
52. By the end of the 1970s Jamaica's largest commercial bank was the National Com-
mercial Bank (NCB) (formerly Barclays Bank D.C.O.). NCB was wholly owned
by the Jamaican Government. The Jamaica Citizens Bank (JCB), which was a
casualty of the financial sector crisis of the 1990s, was, by then, wholly owned by
Jamaican private investors.
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relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. 53
By the mid-1980s, Jamaica's external debt burden became even more
unmanageable and external support from the IMF and the World Bank
increased. 54 By then, there had been a paradigm shift in the approach
adopted by the IMF and World Bank under what became known as "the
Washington Consensus". This required commitment to privatization and
liberalization. 55 The IMF and World Bank reinforced this policy by "en-
couraging" borrower members to privatize state owned entities and liber-
alize their economies. 56
The Jamaican financial sector responded favorably to this policy, and
new institutions mushroomed during the 1980s and 1990s. 57 But, their
growth in the 1980s and 1990s was unsustainable, and during the latter
part of the 1990s, underlying weaknesses were exposed and the sector
suffered a financial crisis. While there is no single factor which explains
the crisis, the sequence of liberalization in the Jamaican financial sector
has been identified as one of its fundamental causes. 58
Under the macro-economic policies adopted at the time, a program of
structural reform aimed at fostering private sector activity and increasing
the role of market forces in resource allocation was actively pursued. 59 In
1991, for example, the government led a more-structured and well-de-
fined macro-economic liberalization program. This program was aimed
specifically at the financial sector. It required removing exchange con-
trols, floating the exchange rate, and removing restrictions on foreign
investment. 60
Within one year of its introduction, the 1991 program resulted in a 156
percent depreciation of the Jamaican dollar against its U.S. counterpart
and inflation spiraled to 80 percent. A tight monetary policy was intro-
duced, and it resulted in a dramatic and unprecedented rise in interest
53. See generally Linton Kwesi Johnson, Jamaica Uncovered, GUARDIAN, Feb. 28,
2003, available at http://arts.guardian.co.uk/fridayreview/story/0,,904020,00.html
[hereinafter Jamaica Uncovered].
54. See generally ECONOMIC OVERVIEW: THE JAMAICAN ECONOMY, Fiscal Year 1
April 2001 - 31 March 2002 http://www.emjamusa.org/economy.htm (visited De-
cember 2005) [hereinafter Jamaican Economy].
55. See generally Sarkar, supra note 1, at p. 28 note 9. The author quotes David
Trubeck, who wrote: "The Washington consensus is a term often used to refer to
the dominant paradigm in development thinking among Bretton Woods institu-
tions [i.e., the World Bank and the IMF]. This approach is radically different from
development thinking in the 1960s when the law and development idea was first
articulated. Then emphasis was placed on central planning, state enterprise and
inwardly oriented import substitution industrialization. The Washington consen-
sus, on the other hand, promotes markets as allocative institutions, favours priva-
tization and promotes closer linkages to the global economy."
56. See generally Jamaican Economy, supra note 54.
57. See generally NLR Johnson, Big Growth in Financial Sector's Operations, Daily
Gleaner, Oct. 18, 2002, available at http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/200210
18/business/business7.html.
58. See generally Jamaican Economy, supra note 54.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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rates. Under the monetary policy employed, the cash reserve ratio was
increased by the BOJ, bank loan rates mushroomed to over 50 percent,
and penalty rates were as high as 100 percent. Many borrowers were
subsequently unable to service their debt obligations. 61
The 1991 program also resulted in deregulation of the price of most
consumer goods and services. Deregulation led to a dramatic increase in
the price of goods and services, and inflationary pressures resulted in
large wage increases. Increases in prices and wages were followed by un-
manageable increases in administrative expenses in the financial sector,
and this increase in administrative expenses was exacerbated by limited
variety of investment vehicles. 62
Among the limited investment vehicles, real estate was most attractive
and it became the preferred hedge for financial institutions. With in-
creased investment in real estate, prices escalated during the early 1990s.
Investment in that sector, including direct investment by financial institu-
tions, showed remarkable growth. But, by the mid-1990s the asset/liabil-
ity mismatch of financial institutions worsened as they used short-term
customer deposits for long-term real estate investments.63 The situation
was untenable, and detailed evaluations have shown that this problem
also contributed significantly to the Jamaican financial sector crisis of the
1990S. 64
Although the Jamaican financial sector relied on self-regulation by ma-
ture and established financial institutions up to and even after indepen-
dence in 1962,65 it did not suffer a real financial crisis before the 1990s. 66
But, the framework for its regulation and supervision was weak and this
manifested in limited levels of entry and monitoring control. 67 Formal
regulation of the whole securities industry, for example, only began in
1993 with enactment of the Jamaican Securities Act.68
By 1993, a complex structure had developed involving unregulated
party related transactions among financial and non-financial institu-
tions.69 Against this background, the financial sector appeared buoyant
between 1993 and 1996 and. grew from $92.4 billion to $197.8 billion, an
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See generally FINSAC Annual Report, supra note 51. The report identified an
"over-exposure to real estate lending or acquisition" as a fundamental weakness in
the Jamaican financial sector. The basic assumption is that the over-exposure to





67. See generally Omar Davies, The Jamaican Economy After Consolidation of the
Financial Sector Portfolios, Lecture Presented at the Management Institute for Na-
tional Development (MIND) (1999), available at http://www.mof.gov.jm/news/
1999/lecture.shtml.
68. See generally Blake, supra note 36.
69. See generally FINSAC,Annual Report supra note 51.
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increase of 114 percent.70 Much of this growth had resulted from unsafe
and connected lending. After the phenomenal growth of 1993 to 1996,
there was a downslide followed by a severe crisis-the repercussions of
which are still being felt in the Jamaican economy. 7 1
Subsequent analysis has determined that prior to the financial sector
crisis of the 1990s the regulation and supervision of the Jamaican financial
sector was compartmentalized and inadequate. 72 Where it existed, regu-
lation and supervision was on an institutional basis. The BOJ had been
conferred with legal authority to regulate and supervise the banking sys-
tem.73 This was done through the DSBFI, which had been established in
the 1960s. Unfortunately, its terms of reference remained unchanged un-
til after the financial sector crisis of the 1990s, and gaps which had devel-
oped were exploited by banks and other financial institutions.74
The analysis also reveals that during the 1990s, Jamaican banks were
involved in high risk lending and investment activities. 75 These risks
included:
Inadequate credit and investment assessment and monitoring;
[e]xcessive credit concentration; [i]nadequate portfolio diversifica-
tion; [o]ver-exposure to real estate lending or acquisition; [high
levels of non-performing assets; [m]ismatch of assets and liabilities
maturity dates; [e]xcessive related party exposure including inappro-
priate connected lending; [n]on-compliance with internal control
procedures; and [n]on-compliance with effective risk management
principles. 76
Another risk was excessive diversification away from core business
lending.
In several cases, insurance companies owned or controlled banks, or
vice versa. This close relationship led to imprudent practices of loan pro-
vision to insurance companies. Banks also moved beyond core business
70. See generally Johnson, supra note 57.
71. See generally PLANNING INST. OF JAM. KINGSTON, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SUR-
VEY JAMAICA 2001, Chap. 7 (2002).
72. There was, for example, no clear structure for regulation and supervision of build-
ing societies.
73. As supervisor of banks and other financial institutions, the BOJ only had access to
those institutions that were licensed to take deposits. But, the BOJ could not su-
pervise holding companies that controlled deposit-taking institutions, and this
loophole was exploited.
74. See generally FINSAC Annual Report, supra note 51. The gaps that developed
included an anomalous situation: where prior to 1995, building societies were
largely autonomous, and neither the Ministry of Finance nor the BOJ had legal
authority to regulate and supervise them. This anomaly was exploited. Those enti-
ties were often used to hive off non-performing loans, and questionable deals were
undertaken through them. See generally Davies., supra note 67. The Minister un-
derscored that gaps included the non-regulation of financial holding companies.
75. See generally WORLD BANK, JAMAICA - SECOND BANK RESTRUCTURING AND
DEBT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/NEWS/O,,contentMDK:20072415-menuPK:51062078-pagePK:
34370-piPK:4607,00.html [hereinafter World Bank Report].
76. See generally FINSAC Annual Report, supra note 51.
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and placed excessive confidence in the real estate market. 77 This market
collapsed in the mid-1990s, and its collapse then contributed to a crisis in
the banking sector.78
During the 1990s, the Jamaican insurance sector was subject to limited
regulation and supervision. Prior to 2001,7 9 it was regulated by the Office
of the Superintendent of Insurance, which was established under the Ja-
maica Insurance Act, 1971. The Office of the Superintendent of Insur-
ance's regulation and supervision were weak and the only meaningful
enforcement measures available to the superintendent were the winding-
up and judicial management options under section 36 of the Insurance
Act, 1971.80 In the aftermath of the crisis, the Office of the Superinten-
dent of Insurance was criticized for its unimpressive supervisory record.8'
Liberalization, however, had created a high returns investment envi-
ronment in the Jamaican financial sector. As a result, insurance compa-
nies were plagued by extremely low overall returns on investments, high
surrender rates due to the deposit-like nature of the new insurance prod-
ucts, high levels of commission for new business, little or no incentives for
renewal business, high levels of expenses significantly above international
industry norms, highly-leveraged operations, and difficulty in meeting
solvency standards. 82 They also became heavily involved in the real es-
tate market,83 and the real estate market's collapse resulted in a solvency
and liquidity crisis for them.84
Although the Jamaican securities sector had been relatively small, it
also sought to benefit from liberalization. After liberalization and prior
to the establishment of the Securities Commission,85 securities brokers,
investment advisors, and other persons involved in the securities sector,
effectively operated in an unregulated environment. 86 Securities dealers
were then able to offer non-traditional products and services to their
customers. 87
While they offered essential banking services, 88 securities dealers were
not subject to banking or any other form of regulation or supervision.89
During the 1990s, the securities sector benefited from its expanded busi-
ness conduct and experienced an unprecedented level of growth.90 But,
77. Id.
78. Id. The crisis in the banking sector was contagious, and it contributed to an overall
crisis in the Jamaican financial sector.
79. The insurance sector is now regulated under the provisions of the Insurance Act,
2001.
80. See generally Blake, supra note 36.
81. Id.
82. See generally FINSAC Annual Report, supra note 51.
83. See generally Davies, supra note 67.
84. See generally FINSAC Annual Report, supra note 51.
85. The Securities Commission was established under the Securities Act, 1993.
86. See generally Davies, supra note 67
87. See generally Hosin, supra note 37.
88. Id.
89. See generally Blake, supra note 36.
90. See generally PLANNING INST. OF JAM. KINGSTON, supra note 71.
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the securities sector was interconnected with banking and insurance, and
problems in those sectors had a negative impact on the securities sector. 91
The problems that led to the Jamaican financial crisis of the 1990s have
been well documented, and there are important lessons to be learned.
The most important lesson is that prudent conduct by service providers,
as well as by consumers, is required for financial stability. The next most
important lesson is that an appropriate regulatory and supervisory regime
is essential. Since the crisis, Jamaica has introduced significant reforms in
the financial sector. Jamaica has now established a better financial sys-
tem than existed before the crisis of the 1990s, and the lessons derived
would be invaluable in any attempt to create an appropriate financial
model for CARICOM.
IV. FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE OECS
The financial system in the OECS is supported by necessary provisions
in the Treaty of Basseterre. The Treaty requires the OECS "to promote
economic integration among the Member States through the provisions
of the Agreement Establishing the East Caribbean Common Market. ''92
The OECS must then "pursue the said purposes through its respective
institutions by discussion of questions of common concern and by agree-
ment and common action."193
The Treaty also requires that Member States shall "co-ordinate, harmo-
nise and pursue joint policies particularly in the fields of... Currency and
Central Banking. 94
On July 5, 1983, the Governments of Antigua and Barbuda, the Com-
monwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher (St. Kitts)
and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (the Participat-
ing Governments) agreed to establish a "Common Central Bank"
(ECCB). Their agreement was based on a desire "to maintain a common
currency and to establish a Common Central Bank with powers to issue
and manage that currency, to safeguard its international value, to pro-
mote monetary stability and a sound financial structure and to further the
economic development of the territories of the Participating
Governments. 95
The ECCB, since established, has been conferred with authority to
"regulate banking business on behalf of and in collaboration with Partici-
pating Governments. '96
In addition to the regulation of banking business, the purposes of the
91. See generally Hosin, supra note 37.
92. See Treaty Establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (Treaty of
Basseterre), art. 3 (1)(e), June 18, 1981, 1338 U.N.T.S. 97, available at http://un-
treaty.org/unts/60001_120000/11/27/00021345.pdf.
93. Id. art. 3 (1)(f).
94. Id. art. 3 (2)(i).
95. See generally Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement Act, 1983, pmbl.
96. Id. art. 3 (2)(e).
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ECCB include: "regulat[ing] the availability of money and credit; '97
"promot[ion] and maint[enance of]monetary stability; ' 98 "promot[ion of]
credit and exchange conditions and a sound financial structure conducive
to the balanced growth and development of the economies of the territo-
ries of the Participating Governments;" 99 and active promotion "through
means consistent with its other objectives the economic development of
the territories of the Participating Governments."'10
A. ECCB AGREEMENT AC-r
The ECCB Agreement Act was agreed at Port of Spain on July 5, 1983.
The Participating Governments have since enacted the ECCB Agree-
ment Act as their domestic legislation and generic references to the Act
should therefore be understood as applicable law in Member States,
where it has full force and legal effect. 01
The central feature of the ECCB Agreement Act is the establishment
of the ECCB. 0 2 The Act specifically replaced the pre-existing Eastern
Caribbean Currency Authority (ECCA), which had been established
under the Eastern Caribbean Currency Agreement, 1965. The ECCA
was abolished on entry into force of the ECCB Agreement Act and upon
establishment of the ECCB. 10 3 The Eastern Caribbean Currency Agree-
ment and all amendments thereto also ceased to exist and terminated on
establishment of the ECCB.10 4
In addition to the purposes set out under article 4, a 1993 amendment
conferred special emergency powers to the ECCB. 10 5 These concern:
prescribed financial institutions, their agents, their affiliates, their holding
companies and subsidiaries, and their directors and officers.10 6
The special emergency powers authorize the ECCB: "to investigate the
affairs of ... financial institution[s and their affiliates] ... and to appoint
a person .. .for that purpose;"10 7 "assume control of and carry on the
affairs of ... financial institution[s] and . . .to take over property and
undertakings of the institution[s];"' 10 8 take appropriate steps "to protect
the interests, and to preserve the rights of depositors and creditors of...
97. Id. art. 4 (1).
98. Id. art. 4 (2).
99. Id. art. 4 (3).
100. Id. art. 4 (4).
101. Id. art 5 (4). While current membership is limited to territories listed in the pream-
ble, article 56 of the ECCB Agreement Act enables membership of other territo-
ries. But admittance to such membership is subject to the discretion of the council
and a two-thirds majority vote of the total number of its members.
102. See id. art. 3. The ECCB must do business it accordance with the ECCB Agree-
ment Act's terms.
103. Id. art. 54 (3).
104. Id. art. 54 (4).
105. Id. pt. IIA.
106. Id. art. 5A (1).
107. Id. art. 5B (1)(c)(i).
108. Id. art. 5B (1)(c)(ii).
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financial institution[s];"109 "restructure the business or undertaking of...
financial institution[s] or reconstruct [their] capital base;" 10 provide fi-
nancial assistance to financial institutions, so as to prevent a collapse;' 
acquire property and assets of financial institutions for sale or other deal-
ing; 12 appoint persons to assist in its emergency functions; 1 3 and stipu-
late prudential criteria for financial institutions and ensure compliance." 14
Article 5B (1)(c) provides that the ECCB shall exercise its powers if it
is of the opinion that: the interests of depositors or creditors are
threatened,11 5 a financial institution is unlikely to meet its payment or
other obligations, 1" 6 or a financial institution is not compliant with sound
prudential standards." 7 As a safeguard, it must be satisfied "that the fi-
nancial system of any of the territories of Participating Governments is in
danger of disruption, substantial damage, injury or impairment as a result
of the circumstances giving rise to the exercise of such powers." 118
The special powers shall be implemented in accordance with provisions
of the ECCB Agreement Act. 119 This requires that the ECCB shall:
publish in the Gazette and in such newspapers as it thinks appropri-
ate, in the territory where it proposes to exercise such powers a noti-
fication to that effect. 120 The [specified] notification must state - (a)
the property and undertaking that the Bank proposes to take over;
(b) the powers of control that the Bank proposes to exercise, and
shall give such particulars as the Bank considers necessary for the
information of persons having business dealings with the financial
institution.' 21
These special powers can be considered as evidencing an unequivocal
commitment by Member States to the proper management and control of
the OECS financial system without undue political interference.
Other parts of the ECCB Agreement Act deal with: "General Reserve
Fund and Profits;" 122 "Administration and Management;"' 123 "Cur-
rency;"'124 "External Reserve;"' 125 "Foreign Exchange Operations;"' 126
"Relations with Financial Institutions;"' 127 "Relations with the Participat-
109. Id. art. 5B (1)(c)(iii).
110. Id. art. 5B (1)(c)(iv).
111. Id. art. 5B (1)(c)(v).
112. Id. art. 5B (1)(c)(vi).
113. Id. art. 5B (l)(c)(vii).
114. Id. art. 5B (1)(c)(viii).
115. Id. art. 5B (1)(a).
116. Id. art. 5B (1)(b).
117. Id. art. 5B (1)(c).
118. Id. art. 5B (2).
119. Id. arts. 5B (3)-5E (4).
120. Id. rt. 5C (1).
121. Id. art. 5C (2).
122. Id. pt. III.
123. Id. pt. IV.
124. Id. pt. V.
125. Id. pt. VI.
126. Id. pt. VII.
127. Id. pt. VIII.
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ing Governments;" 128 "Accounts and Statements;" 129 "Immunities, Privi-
leges and Arbitration of Disputes;"'130  and "Withdrawal and
Termination."1 31 These provisions are also critical to the proper manage-
ment and control of the OECS financial system.
The Administration and Management provisions, for example, require
the establishment of a "Monetary Council."1 32 It "shall meet not less
than twice each year to receive from the Governor the Bank's report on
monetary and credit conditions and to provide directives and guidelines
on matters of monetary and credit policy .... ,"133 Decisions of the coun-
cil on monetary and credit policy are binding on the ECCB. 134 But, the
ECCB has direct input in policy construction through a board in which its
powers are vested. 135 The board is comprised of the governor, the deputy
governor and one director appointed by each Participating Govern-
ment.136 The board is empowered to make, alter, or revoke regulations,
notices, and orders. 37
The currency provisions entrench the Eastern Caribbean Dollar as the
monetary unit of the Participating Governments. 38 The ECCB has the
sole right to issue currency notes and coins in the territories of the Partici-
pating Governments 39 and it "shall on the recommendation of the Board
approved by a decision of the Council, both such recommendation and
decision having been adopted unanimously by all their members declare
the external value for the Eastern Caribbean Dollar. ."... ,140 This provi-
sion is critical to the central role of the ECCB in monetary policy.
The ECCB is lender of last resort 14' and may prescribe and maintain
reserve and security holdings. 142 This role is complemented by an inspec-
tion and compliance function. 143
The ECCB is also the depository of the external assets of the Partici-
pating Governments.14 4 In this role, the ECCB determines gold and for-
eign currency rates145 and may take steps, in the interest of Participating
Governments, "to prevent disorderly conditions in the foreign exchange
markets .... ",146 The ECCB may also open accounts for and accept de-
128. Id. pt. IX.
129. Id. pt. XI.
130. Id. pt. XII.
131. Id. pt. XIII.
132. Id. art. 7 (1).
133. Id. art. 7 (2).
134. Id. art. 7 (6).
135. Id. art. 8 (1).
136. Id. art. 8 (3).
137. Id. art. 8 (2).
138. Id. art. 17 (1).
139. Id. art. 18 (1).
140. Id. art. 17 (2).
141. Id. art. 31.
142. Id. art. 33.
143. Id. art. 35.
144. Id. art. 25 (1).
145. Id. art. 28 (1).
146. Id. art. 28 (3).
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posits from financial institutions doing business in the territories of Par-
ticipating Governments. 14 7
Consistent economic policy requires close collaboration between fiscal
and monetary affairs. With this in mind, the Participating Governments
have made the ECCB their banker, fiscal agent, and advisor on monetary
and financial matters.14 8 In these roles, the ECCB shall inform and ad-
vise the Council and Participating Governments concerning any matter
that will likely affect its purposes 49 and may also represent any Partici-
pating Government at external conferences. 150
As banker, the ECCB may "make temporary advances to ... Partici-
pating Government[s]"; 5 1 "purchase, sell, discount and rediscount trea-
sury bills . . . of the Participating Government[s], payable in Eastern
Caribbean Dollars . . . maturing within ninety-one days of ... acquisi-
tion"; 52 "purchase and sell publicly issued securities (other than treasury
bills) of or guaranteed by... Participating Governments payable in East-
ern Caribbean Dollars" that mature within fifteen years of acquisition; 5 3
invest in securities of Participating Governments;1 54 and "purchase and
sell bonds of any Corporation established under the authority of... Par-
ticipating... Governments for the express purpose of financing develop-
ment within the territory," provided express conditions are satisfied.'5 5
As an agent, the ECCB shall administer law and regulation relating to
exchange control, 156 as well as "monitor the operations of offshore finan-
cial institutions.' 57 This authority complements the ECCB's role as
banker in that it enables direct contact with the offshore sector. While it
has to date been treated as special, prudence would suggest that the off-
shore sector should be within general oversight by the ECCB as it consti-
tutes an important economic component within the financial sector.
The ECCB has been conferred with special status, immunities, and
privileges in the territories of the Participating Governments.1 58 Where
there are disputes, these shall be resolved under an established procedure
requiring arbitration by a tribunal appointed in a prescribed manner. 15 9
Participating Governments may withdraw in a prescribed manner, 160 and
the council may terminate its operations "by resolution adopted by a two-
thirds majority of all its members .... ,,161
147. Id. art. 30.
148. Id. art. 37 (1).
149. Id. art. 37 (3).
150. Id. art. 37 (4).
151. Id. art. 40 (1)(a).
152. Id. art. 40 (1)(b).
153. Id. art. 40 (1)(c).
154. Id. art. 40 (1)(d).
155. Id. art. 40 (1)(e).
156. Id. art. 41 (1).
157. Id. art. 41 (2).
158. Id. art. 50.
159. Id. art. 51.
160. Id. art. 52.
161. Id. art. 53.
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B. UNIFORM BANKING Acr
The banking acts across the OECS Monetary Union derive from "An
Act to Provide for Regulating Banking Business in the ECCB Territo-
ries." 162 Collectively these banking acts are referred to as the Uniform
Banking Act (the Banking Act). Domestic legislation to adopt the Uni-
form Banking Act was enacted between 1988 and 1992. Since then, a
platform has been set for full harmonization of banking business in the
OECS.163
The Uniform Banking Act provides that a bank is "any financial insti-
tution whose operations include acceptance of deposits subject to the
transfer by the depositor by cheque."' 164 A "'financial institution' in-
cludes any person doing banking business and all offices and branches of
a financial institution in [a given territory] shall be deemed to be one
financial institution."'165 Banking has been defined as:
The business of receiving funds through -
(i) the acceptance of monetary deposits which are repayable on de-
mand or after notice or any similar operation;
(ii) the sale or placement of bonds, certificates, notes or other securi-
ties and the use of such funds, either in whole or in part, for loans or
investment for the risk of the customer; and includes - any other
activity recognised by the Central Bank as banking practice and
which a financial institution may additionally be authorised to do. 166
As central banker, 167 the ECCB has responsibility for the granting and
renewing of licenses;' 68 establishing and maintaining financial require-
ments and limitations; 169 examining information required to be provided
by financial institutions; 70 advising the minister of finance in matters re-
lating to business liquidation, business reorganization, or the appoint-
ment of a receiver; 171 and upon request, investigating and reporting on
proposed transfers of a banking business. 172 While ultimate authority in
the application of the Act is vested in the relevant Minister of Finance, 173
the ECCB has unfettered authority to examine banking activities. 174
The audit, information and inspection provisions of the Uniform Bank-
162. See Banking Act: An Act to Provide for Regulating Banking Business in the
ECCB Territories, E. Caribbean Cent. Bank Territories, 1988-1992.
163. See generally Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), http://www.eccb-central
bank.org.




168. Id. pt. I.
169. Id. pt. II.
170. Id. pt. III.
171. Id. pt. V.
172. Id. pt. VII.
173. Id. pt. I. Section 3(1) provides: "A person shall not carry on banking business...
[in a given territory] without a licence granted by the Minister."
174. Id. pt. III.
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ing Act 175 have significant implications for financial harmonization in the
OECS. These provisions require an annual audit to be conducted and, if
requested, the auditor to "report and publish financial statements and
results"; 176 periodic and snap examinations of financial institutions;' 77
"[d]isclosure and access to books and records;"'178 corrective or other
measures to prevent unlawful or unsound business conduct; 179 the pro-
duction of certain information required by the ECCB; 180 and forbearance
from misleading advertising practices. 181 By reference to these and other
provisions in the Act, 182 the ECCB obtains essential information to assess
the performance of the financial system and to make informed policy
decisions. 183
Complemented by the ECCB Agreement Act, the Uniform Banking
Act has entrenched, as a matter of policy and legislative record, an unfet-
tered regulatory and supervisory role for the ECCB. 184 As a result, the
OECS financial system has been enhanced-with the ultimate objective
being the establishment of harmonized laws consistent with the best in-
ternational practices. The OECS policy is also geared to the adoption of
a single regulatory and supervisory unit for financial services in Member
States. 185 While this latter objective has not yet been attained, from this
discussion it can be concluded that there are already significant levels of
harmonization in the OECS banking sector.
C. SECURITIES Acr
Money and capital markets have a central role in the financial sector.
They enable better risk pooling and risk sharing opportunities that en-
hance the resilience of economies and make them less vulnerable to fi-
nancial crises.186 While there are distinctions between how capital and
money markets operate, they can both be considered as being within the
securities sub-sector of the financial market.187
175. Id.
176. Id. § 19.
177. Id. § 20.
178. Id. § 21.
179. Id. § 22.
180. Id. § 23.
181. Id. § 24.
182. Id. § 33. Under section 33, the ECCB is conferred with authority to recommend
financial regulations. These affect: (1) content of reports and other information
required of financial institutions; (2) content of records, returns, and reports; and
(3) character and timeframe for provision of reports and returns.
183. See generally ECCB, supra note 163.
184. See generally Banking Act, pt. III.
185. See generally ECCB, supra note 163.
186. See generally COMM. OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE OF WISE
MEN ON THE REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKET (Feb. 15,
2001), available at http://www.cesr-eu.org (follow "Documents" hyperlink; then
search for "Lamfalussy Report".
187. Id.; see generally George A. Walker, Capital Reform, Financial Services and Single
Markets: A Regulatory Overview (May 2, 2006), (unpublished paper presented at
the second Biennial International Conference on Business, Banking & Finance at
the University of The West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad).
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Securities include: share and stocks in the share capital of a company;
indebtedness evidenced by debentures, debenture stock, loan stock
bonds, and notes; government bonds and other instruments; options to
subscribe for shares or debt securities; options to acquire or dispose of
any security; and units in collective investment schemes.' 88 But the fol-
lowing are not considered securities under the OECS Securities Act: bills
of exchange, treasury bills with original short term maturity dates, prom-
issory notes with short term maturity dates, and certificates of deposits
issued by licensed financial institutions. 89
Securities are usually traded on a formal exchange. Under the Securi-
ties Act, a securities exchange has been determined to be "a market, ex-
change, place or facility which provides for bringing together on a regular
basis purchasers and sellers of securities, and sets of rules for the execu-
tion of securities transactions or for the negotiation or conclusion of sales
and purchases of securities ...."-190 An over-the-counter exchange
(OTC) or alternative trading platform (ATP), relying on the internet or
an intranet mechanism, is not prohibited and would therefore qualify as
an exchange.
Nevertheless, any exchange within the OECS would have to include
adequate facilities for the conduct of business, 91 enable competition
among at least three members, 92 ensure that business is conducted in an
orderly manner and have the capacity to protect investors, 93 satisfy es-
tablished regulatory and compliance requirements,' 94 and enable a clos-
ing out of the position of a member who is unable to satisfy market
contracts.1 95
Capital market development in the OECS can be traced to the early
1990s. During that period:
[T]he Monetary Council of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
(ECCB) mandated the Bank to proceed with the activation of Arti-
cle 4(3) of the Agreement, which ... [required it] . . . 'to promote
credit and exchange conditions and a sound financial structure con-
ducive to the balanced growth and development of the economies of
the territories of the participating Governments.'"1 96
Significant steps have since been taken to develop and integrate the
monetary and capital markets of the OECS. These steps have included
the enactment of the Securities Act and the opening of the Eastern Car-
188. See Securities Act, 2001, § 2.
189. Id. Short-term treasury bills are those with original maturity of less than 90 days.
Short-term promissory notes are notes for less than 275 days.
190. Id. § 2.
191. Id. § 10(2)(b).
192. Id. § 10(2)(c).
193. Id. § 10(2)(d).
194. Id. § 10(2)(e).
195. Id. § 10(2)(0.
196. ECCB, Money and Capital Markets, http://www.eccb-centralbank.orgMoney/in-
dex.asp.
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ibbean Securities Exchange Limited (ESCE) in October 2001.197
While it is usually referred to as the Securities Act, without qualifica-
tion, the long title for the 2001 Act is: "An Act to provide for the protec-
tion of investors in securities through regional Eastern Caribbean
Securities Regulatory Commission, by regulating the securities market,
exchanges and persons engaged in securities business, and by regulating
the public issue of securities and to provide for related matters."' 198 Al-
though this title emphasizes the regulatory scope of the Securities Act, its
detailed provisions indicate much more comprehensive scope and
coverage. 199
The Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission (ECSRC)
could be considered to be the most critical feature of the Securities
Act.2° ° The ECSRC was established under the Agreement Establishing
the Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission of November
24, 2000 (the Agreement). 20 1 The primary objective of the ECSRC is to
ensure that the market operates safely and soundly. 20 2
The ECSRC has been established as a legal body vested with all the
powers and characteristics of a body corporate having perpetual succes-
sion and a common seal.20 3 It is required to: "Promote the development
of and to provide for the regulation of a regional securities market in the
territories of the Participating Governments and to establish the Eastern
Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission (ECSRC) as an indepen-
dent and autonomous regional regulatory body. '20 4 The ECSRC is also
required to grant licenses to persons engaged in the securities business,
monitor and supervise the conduct of such business by licensees, and pro-
mote the growth and development of the capital markets.20 5
In addition, the ECSRC shall do all things incidental to the attainment
of its prescribed purposes. 2° 6 It must therefore support the operation of
an orderly, fair, and properly informed securities market as well as regu-
late the manner of trading and the range of securities traded. 20 7
The Securities Act established a commission (the ECSRC) and the
ECSRC Agreement provides for the commission's composition;20 8 how
the commission's chairperson, deputy chairperson and secretary shall be
appointed; 20 9 the terms of office of the chairperson, deputy chairperson,
197. Id.
198. See Securities Act, 2001.
199. Id.
200. Id. sched. art. 3.
201. Id. § 2.
202. See generally Eastern Caribbean Securities Regulatory Commission (ECSRC),
http://www.ecsrc.com/about.php (last visited June. 2, 2008.
203. Securities Act, , § 3; see also Securities Act, sched., art 3.
204. See Securities Act, sched., pmbl.
205. Id., sched., art 4.
206. Id. art. 5.
207. Id. art. 6.
208. Id. art. 12.
209. Id. art. 13.
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and other commissioners; 210 the manner of vacation of and removal from
office of commissioners; 21' and notice, quorum, and other particulars for
meetings. 212 The ECSRC Agreement has also conferred administrative
capacity on the commission;213 dealt with financial arrangements, such as
funding audits and accounts; 214 enabled the commission to make rules
concerning "any ... matter relating to the organisation, procedure, ad-
ministration or practice of the Commission; '21 5 established a procedure
for settlement of disputes;216 and accorded certain immunities and privi-
leges to it.217
The Securities Act has been enacted in all the territories of the
OECS.21 8 This was done as part of an initiative of the Financial and En-
terprise Development Department (FEDD) of the ECCB-a special unit
with the mandate to develop and integrate the money and capital markets
of the OECS into a single financial space. The FEDD has also been re-
sponsible for other integration and harmonization initiatives. These have
included establishment of the Eastern Caribbean Home Mortgage Bank,
the Regional Government Securities Market, the Eastern Caribbean En-
terprise Fund, the Eastern Caribbean Unit Trust, the Interbank Market,
and the Eastern Caribbean Institute of Banking and Financial Services.219
V. DRAFT AGREEMENT
The draft CARICOM Financial Services Agreement (CFSA) has a Pre-
amble, forty articles and three appendices. The CFSA's articles include
provisions concerning: Scope and Coverage; 220 Market Access for Finan-
cial Institutions;22' Intraregional Trade in Financial Services; 222 Cross-
Border Supervision of Transnational Financial Corporations and Con-
glomerates;223 New Financial Services; 224 Prudential Carve Out/Require-
ments; 225 Mergers and Acquisitions in the Financial Services Sector;226
Corporate Governance; 227 Transparency; 228 and Settlement of Dis-
210. Id. art. 15.
211. Id. art. 16.
212. Id. art. 17.
213. Id. art. 18.
214. Id. pt. IV.
215. Id. art. 31.
216. Id. art. 33.
217. Id. art. 34.
218. See ECSRC, supra note 202.
219. ECCB, Money and Capital Markets, supra note 196.
220. See CFSA, supra note 2, art. 2.
221. Id. art. 3.
222. Id. art. 4.
223. Id. art. 5.
224. Id. art. 7.
225. Id. art. 11.
226. Id. art. 17.
227. Id. art. 19.
228. Id. art. 22.
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putes.2 29 The Appendices determine the nature of: Banking Services;2 30
Services of a Financial Nature;231 and Investments.2 3 2
The CFSA has not clearly established its objectives under any of its
articles. Nevertheless, the preamble provides some guidance as to what
would have been intended. Under the CFSA, the parties recognize that
"[1]iberalisation, globalisation and the CARICOM Single Market and
Economy (CSME) have intensified both international and regional com-
petition the production and delivery of financial services. ' 233 They are
conscious that "Member States of the Caribbean Community are increas-
ingly open to penetration by financial services providers from both inten-
tional and regional sources." 234  And acknowledge that: "The
development and application of harmonised regional standards in the fi-
nancial services sector are essential for the efficient operation of the
CARICOM Single Market and Economy and, in particular, the provision
of financial services in the Caribbean Community. '23 5 They are also con-
scious that: "The formulation and application of internationally accepted
standards and best practices on a regional basis would enhance the inter-
national competitiveness of the financial services sector within the CAR-
ICOM Single Market and Economy and assist the regional institutions in
the provision of financial services worldwide. '2 36 And have been con-
vinced that: "The execution of a Financial Services Agreement would fa-
cilitate intra regional operations and improve the delivery of financial
services within the Caribbean Community. '237
These "objectives" articulate the importance of the financial sector to
the CSME as well as the need for the implementation of internationally
accepted financial standards and best practices. They do not, however,
explicitly or otherwise support the establishment of an integrated re-
gional financial market. Indeed, the parties have apparently not been
convinced that the CFSA would assist such an undertaking.
While the CFSA could, without more, be considered an unreliable
foundation for financial market integration, the analysis here will never-
theless emphasize some of the CFSA's essential provisions and, by exten-
sion, seek to determine the CFSA's substantive value "as a means of
safeguarding and promoting development of the financial services sector
in the Caribbean Community. '2 38 This process will also help to clarify
whether there is need for an alternative CARICOM Financial Integration
Model.
229. Id. art. 23.
230. Id. app. I.
231. Id. app. II,
232. Id. app. III.
233. Id. pmbl. 1 1.
234. Id. 2.
235. Id. 91. 4.
236. Id. 5.
237. Id. 1 6.
238. Id. 1 3.
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A. SCOPE AND COVERAGE
The CFSA is intended to affect:
Measures adopted or maintained by a State relating to:
(a) a financial institution of another State;
(b) a financial activity from another State;
(c) a financial transaction of a participant, in a financial institution in
the territory of another State;
(d) cross-border trade in financial services;
(e) the supervision of a financial institution; and
(f) a contingent right.239
It is not, however, intended to affect:
Measures adopted or maintained by a State relating to:
(a) activities or a financial service forming part of a public retirement
plan or statutory system social security;
(b) government procurement;
(c) activities conducted a central bank or monetary authority or by
any other public entity in pursuit of monetary or exchange rate poli-
cies; and
(d) any other activity conducted by public entity for the account or
with the guarantee or using the financial resources of
Government. 240
Article 1 defines a "financial institution" as including "[a]ny financial
intermediary or other enterprise that is authorised to do banking or fi-
nancial business and regulated or supervised as a financial institution
under the law of the State in whose territory it is located. '24 1 And a
"financial service" is "any service of a financial nature listed in Appendix
II. '"242 These have been determined to be certain established activities
when performed by a finance house or finance company, credit union,
merchant bank, mortgage institution, trust company, unit trust, credit
card business, financial services, and insurance and insurance related
services. 243
While "trade in financial services" could have been understood to
mean participation in an established activity through the class of institu-
tions determined in Appendix II, the term has nevertheless been defined
to mean:
The supply of a financial service through the following modes:
(a) from the territory of a State into the territory of other State;
(b) in the territory of a State to the financial service consumer of
another State;
(c) by a financial service supplier of a State, through the commercial
presence in the territory of another State;
239. Id. art. 2 (1).
240. Id. art. 2 (2).
241. Id. art. 1.
242. Id.
243. Id. app. II.
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(d) by a financial service supplier of a State, through the presence of
a natural person of a State in the territory of another State.
244
The CFSA has not determined what constitutes "cross-border" or a
"contingent right" over which it is intended to apply.
Curiously, the CFSA will not affect the cross-border supply of banking
services. This conclusion is derived because the relevant provision ap-
plies to financial services as defined in Appendix II and banking services
are covered under Appendix 1.245 This lacuna is unfortunate for two
main reasons. First, coverage for banking appears to have been in-
tended.246 Second, there has already been significant cross-border
merger and acquisition activity as well as consequential trade in banking
products and services within CARICOM. 247
In the preamble, the CFSA states that the parties acknowledge the
need to develop and apply regional standards in the financial sector. But,
the intended scope of the CFSA does not require harmonized regulations
for trade in financial services by nationals within their own territory.
24 8 It
would nevertheless apply to the supervision of domestic service provid-
ers.249 But, on point of fact, supervision is an administrative function that
is ordinarily supported by regulations.2 5 0 The CFSA cannot therefore be
relied upon as a foundation for the attainment of common regional
standards.
B. MARKET ACCESS
The securing of the cross-border market access of intra-regional finan-
cial service suppliers is one of the most important components of any
regional arrangement. Under the CFSA:
A State shall accord a financial service and a financial service supplier
of another State treatment no less favourable than that provided for
under the terms, limitations and conditions specified in Chapter Three of
the Treaty in areas where market-access commitments are undertaken, as
set out in Articles 32-40 of the Treaty.
25 1
This provision, like every other under the CFSA, would have been de-
signed with the idea of collective sovereignty in mind. Therefore, the
right of the individual state to protect its own domain is paramount.
244.
245. Id. art. 2(1)(d).
246. See generally id. art. 1. A "financial institution" is defined to include banks and
appendix I sets out what are "banking services.")
247. See generally Eleanor Brown, The CSME and the Integration of Financial Services,
in PRODUCrION INTEGRATION IN CARICOM: From Theory to Action 176-77 (De-
nis Benn & Kenneth Hall eds., 2006).
248. See CFSA, supra note 2, annex art. 1 (defining "trade in financial services").
249. Id. art. 2 (1)(e); see also id. art. 1, (defining "State" as a "Member State of the
Community").
250. For a discussion as to the nature and function of supervision and how it relates to
regulation, see generally GEORGE A. WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGU.
LATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE, note 1 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2001).
251. CFSA, supra note 2.
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Subject to treaty exceptions, articles 32-40 require: that no new restric-
tions on the right of establishment are introduced; 52 the removal of ex-
isting restrictions on the rights of establishment;2 53 that the removal of
restrictions are managed in accordance with an established schedule of
priorities;2 54 the establishment of common standards and measures for
accreditation or the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and
other evidence of qualification; 255 that no new restrictions are introduced
on the provision of services; 256 that discriminatory restrictions on the pro-
vision of services are abolished;257 that discriminatory restrictions on
banking, insurance and other financial services are removed; 258 that no
new restrictions on movement of capital and current transactions are in-
troduced;2 59 and that existing restrictions movement of capital and cur-
rent transactions are removed on an established schedule. 260
In addition, the CFSA also prohibits a state from adopting or maintain-
ing any measure that imposes numerical or other established limitations
on financial service suppliers, 26' restricts or requires the use of specific
investment vehicles, 262 or restricts the participation of foreign capital.2 63
While these requirements would benefit the intra-regional or cross-bor-
der supply of financial services, they have nevertheless been devised
under an agreement that does not require the establishment of an inte-
grated financial market. The requirements could therefore be considered
to have created an inappropriate foundation for the attainment of such an
objective. This gap is emphasized further because the CFSA lacks suffi-
cient or required details for implementation.
C. INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE
An appropriate regime for the cross-border trade in financial services
would be an important component of any regional arrangement. This re-
gime should be designed to secure market access and control based upon
transparent, non-discriminatory, and rules-based criteria. Nevertheless,
without a full financial integration model, necessary measures or condi-
tions will have to be introduced to protect national interests on prudential
or other basis.264
252. See generally Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Commu-
nity Including the Caricom Single Market and Economy, art. 32, July 4, 1973, avail-
able at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/Community/revised-treaty-text.pdf [hereinafter
Revised Treaty].
253. Id. art. 33.
254. Id. art. 34.
255. Id. art. 35.
256. Id. art. 36.
257. Id. art. 37.
258. Id. art. 38.
259. Id. art. 39.
260. Id. art. 40.
261. See CFSA, supra note 2, art. 3 (3)(a).
262. Id. art. 3 (3) (b).
263. Id. art. 3 (3) (c).
264. Id. arts. 4 (3)-(6).
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Although significant financial activities involving the state are not af-
fected by the CFSA,265 their capacity to supply cross-border financial ser-
vices has nevertheless been protected.2 66 This protection appears to be
outside the scope and intended coverage of the CFSA.267 Other suppliers
are also protected and:
A State may not adopt measures restricting any type of intra regional
trade in financial services by a regional financial service provider of
another State that the State permits on the date of entry into force of
this Agreement, except as set out in Article 43 of the Treaty in rela-
tion to the imposition of restrictions to safeguard the balance of pay-
ments or to address external financial difficulties or any threat
thereof.2 68
While these provisions are critical, they have been included under an
agreement that requires the establishment of an integrated, regional fi-
nancial market. It could therefore be considered inappropriate for the
attainment of such an objective. This inadequacy is further compounded
as the CFSA does not provide sufficient or required details for
implementation.
D. CROss-BORDER SUPERVISION
The cross-border supervision of intra regional financial service suppli-
ers is critical. The CFSA requires that a state shall establish the necessary
legal framework to ensure that: a home supervisor or home regulator is
able to fully assess the operations of a financial institution for sound-
ness;269 a home supervisor or regulator is able to verify the accuracy of
information received and that there is no regulatory or supervisory
gap;270 information may be shared with relevant authorities in another
State;271 and information is provided in accordance with established law
or under prior agreement. 272
These requirements establish general guidelines without including suf-
ficient details to secure the implementation of common standards. With-
out an intervention to achieve this, the CFSA would have to be
considered an inadequate basis for an integrated, regional financial mar-
ket where participants are able to function across borders on common
standards.
265. Id. art. 2 (2).
266. Id. art. 4 (1).
267. Id. art. 2. Article 1 provides that a public entity would not qualify as a "financial
service supplier." While the term "public entity" does not include the state, it is
clear that the state would not qualify as a "financial service supplier."
268. Id. art. 4 (5).
269. Id. art. 5 (a).
270. Id. art. 5 (b).
271. Id. art. 5 (c).
272. Id. art. 5 (d).
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E. NEW FINANCIAL SERVICES
A new financial service would be "a service of a financial nature, in-
cluding services related to existing and new products or the manner in
which a product is delivered. ' 273 Regarding these services, a state shall
permit a financial service supplier from another State, which is estab-
lished in its territory, to offer them-unless this would require the enact-
ment of new law or the modification of existing law.274 Nevertheless, the
host State may determine the legal form through which such service is to
be provided and may require authorization. 275 Authorization shall, how-
ever, be provided within a reasonable time, and refusal must be for pru-
dential reasons or in the public interest.276
Under article seven, cross-border financial service suppliers would be
able to exploit existing law as a basis for the introduction of unavailable
products and services with a legitimate expectation that the required per-
mits will be granted. But, the proviso-refused for prudential purposes
or in the public interest-could be considered a state-held a trump card
for the protection of domestic service suppliers and could be used to jus-
tify unintended grounds for refusal. Nevertheless, a similar proviso
would likely appear in any financial services model for CARICOM that
does not require financial integration.277
F. PRUDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS
The prudential requirements of the CFSA have been devised so that
Member States may adopt or maintain reasonable measures for:
(a) the protection of an investor, depositor, financial market partici-
pant, policyholder, or person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a
financial services supplier;
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial
responsibility of a financial service supplier; and
(c) ensuring the integrity and stability of the financial system of a
State.278
Member States would have significant discretion in determining what
measures to apply. Nevertheless, they shall not use non-conforming mea-
sures to avoid their commitments or obligations under the CFSA.279
273. Id. art. 1.
274. Id. art. 7 (1).
275. Id. art. 7 (2).
276. Id. art. 7 (3).
277. Financial integration represents one aspect of the larger economic integration pro-
cess. More specifically, financial integration, as used in this article, refers to the
integration of the main financial sectors on a region-wide basis , the further ap-
proximation or harmonization of financial laws, the free movement of capital and
cross-border establishment of financial businesses, and the creation in other areas
of monetary and economic policy. See generally WILLEM MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS
OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY (5th ed. 2006).
278. See CFSA, supra note 2, art. 11 (1).
279. Id. art. 11 (2).
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While these requirements are important, they have been devised under
an agreement that does not require the establishment of an integrated
financial market. The CFSA also lacks sufficient or required implement-
ing rules and is therefore an inadequate framework to achieve its desired
objectives.
G. MERGERS AND AcQUISITION
Mergers and acquisitions have been considered to be important effi-
ciency promoting and regional competitiveness strategies.2 8 0 Therefore, a
state shall permit intra-regional mergers and acquisitions in its territory
from intra-regional entities in accordance with the Treaty and provisions
of its domestic laws.28 1 The state shall also "ensure that appropriate rules
exist [to] address any intraregional hostile takeovers. '282
While these provisions are critical, the CFSA should have gone further
to determine the required content for adoption or, in the alternative, pro-
vided clear guidelines as to what would have to be included in functional
rules when devised by Member States. Without this approach, uneven
rules can be developed that would undermine any attempt to establish
harmonized regional standards for mergers and acquisitions in the finan-
cial sector.
H. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The inclusion of an appropriate regime to secure the proper govern-
ance of financial institutions is an important component of any financial
regulatory model. Under the CFSA, a state shall ensure that:
(a) a supervisory authority takes steps to enable [gatekeepers] (for
example accountants, auditors, lawyers) to maintain the highest level
of professional conduct and that their functions are executed with
honesty, integrity and impartiality;
(b) a financial supervisory authority sets the guidelines and codes of
conduct including measures to avoid conflict of interests, for the fi-
nancial institution and related parties; and
(c) a financial institution conducts its affairs with the highest level of
prudence and integrity to maintain stability in the financial
system.283
While these requirements are significant, they have not established suffi-
cient details of a regional standard that would have to be included in
relevant regulations or the basis on which supervisors should act. Une-
ven standards could therefore develop and inhibit the establishment of an
integrated regional financial market.
280. Id. art. 17 (1).
281. Id.
282. Id. art. 17 (2).
283. Id. art. 19.
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I. TRANSPARENCY
The transparent application of relevant regulatory standards and prac-
tices are an important function under the CFSA. 284 To achieve this, a
state must ensure that sufficient and timely information is provided to
intra-regional service suppliers. A state, for example, shall: "To the ex-
tent practicable, publish in advance any regulations general application
relating to the financial services sector that it proposes to adopt to facili-
tate access of a financial institution and financial service supplier, and
their operations in a State. '' 285 A state shall also: "Ensure that the regu-
latory authority in its State exercise its function in an expeditious manner
and make available to any interested person the requirements for compli-
ance with its domestic laws, including any documentation required for
completing applications relating supply of financial services." 286
These requirements establish general guidelines but do not include suf-
ficient or required implementing details. Therefore, even if it could be
said that the CFSA is committed to transparency in principle, it could still
be argued that it is an unreliable basis on which to establish an integrated
regional financial market supported by common and transparent
standards.
J. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Disputes under the CFSA shall be settled in accordance with Chapter
Nine of the Revised Treaty.287 It can therefore be concluded that rele-
vant proceedings have to be brought by a state and must concern the
interpretation and application of the CFSA where there are:
(a) allegations that an actual or proposed measure of another Mem-
ber State is, or would be, inconsistent with the objectives of the
Community;
(b) allegations of injury, serious prejudice suffered or likely to be
suffered, nullification or impairment of benefits expected from the
establishment and operation of the CMSE [CARICOM Single Mar-
ket and Economy];
(c) allegations that [a relevant person or authority] has acted ultra
vires; or
(d) allegations that the purpose or the object of the [CFSA] is being
frustrated or prejudiced.2 88
As provided under the Revised Treaty, disputes shall be settled by re-
course to "good offices, mediation, consultations, conciliation, arbitration
and adjudication. '289 Nevertheless, the applicability of any of these
modes is subject to the provisions of the CFSA.2 90 The CFSA requires,
284. Id. art. 22.
285. Id. art. 22 (1) (a).
286. Id. art. 22 (1) (b).
287. Id. art. 23 (1).
288. See Revised Treaty, supra note 252, art. 187.
289. Id. art. 188.
290. See Annex, supra note 3, art. 23 (1).
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for example, that: "Upon initiation of a consultation, a State shall provide
information to enable the examination of how a measure of that State or
any other matter may affect the operation and application of the Agree-
ment, and give confidential treatment of the information exchanged dur-
ing any consultation." 291 If a dispute is not resolved within a prescribed
number of days after the holding of a consultation, the aggrieved state
may request in writing the establishment of an arbitration panel. 292 This
latter procedure would proceed on the basis established under the
CFSA.29
3
The dispute settlement regime reflects that the CFSA may be more
concerned with maintaining good state relations at the governmental
level than securing the effective market participation of individuals. This
is a curious position since the CFSA is intended to regulate the cross-
border supply of financial services by non-state entities. 294 It can there-
fore be argued that these persons are likely to be most affected by the
application of the CFSA and should be able to access its dispute settle-
ment regime by individual action. 295
VI. OUTLINE DRAFTING INSTRUCTIONS
The CFSA has been considered to have included inadequate details
and therefore offers limited guidance to policymakers and other inter-
ested persons. With this mind, since the CFSA was not intended to pro-
vide support for financial market integration, it is necessary to suggest
that an alternative financial model should be devised for CARICOM.
This section will examine required details that would have to be in-
cluded in an appropriate model to achieve the integration of the CAR-
ICOM financial sector. The required details include: Objectives,
Authorization, Regulation, Supervision, Central Bank, Enforcement, Im-
plementation, and Ongoing Review and Corrective Adjustment provi-
sions. Proposed Outline Drafting Instructions for an Integrated
CARICOM Financial Sector (ICFS) have been appended to this
article.29
6
291. Id. art. 23 (2).
292. Id. art. 23 (4).
293. Id. art. 23 (5) - (10).
294. Supra s A (1).
295. According rights to individual persons under an interstate agreement is a normal
Bilateral Investment Treaties' (BITs) practice. This is also a feature of the Inter-
national Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Agreement.
296. Annex, supra note 3. The Outline Drafting Instructions have been constructed
with assistance from Caryle-Anne (Carla) Herbert, who is a legislative drafter and
law reform specialist. Herbert has over thirty years of law reform and drafting
experience and has been based in Trinidad and Tobago for over twenty years. She
has been involved in specialist projects for government agencies in Antigua and
Barbuda, Australia, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Commonwealth of
Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago. She has also
performed assignments on behalf of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Carib-
bean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD), the Caribbean De-
velopment Bank (CDB), the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation
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A. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of a financial integration model for CARICOM must
include: establishing a reliable regional framework for the financial sys-
tem and the integration process more generally; securing the elimination
of unnecessary bureaucratic and other barriers to the cross-border provi-
sion of financial services; promoting market confidence, public aware-
ness, and consumer protection; and reducing financial crime. The
objectives must also include assuring effective implementation and en-
forcement of agreed and consequential measures and requiring ongoing
sector review and corrective adjustments when necessary.
1. Regional Framework
Macro-economic stability is a prerequisite for financial sector stabil-
ity.297 Consequently, any regional framework for the financial sector
must have the capacity to generate economic growth and reduce the pos-
sibility of unnecessary risks that could result from operational limitations
in the financial system. 298 This is a key objective and should be assured
through detailed provisions in the regulatory and supervisory aspects of
any proposed new CARICOM model.299
2. Bureaucratic and Other Barriers
Unnecessary bureaucratic or other barriers to the cross-border provi-
sion of financial services, as well as free movement, could complicate, if
not undermine, the establishment of an integrated financial market. With
this in mind, the proposed new model will have to include the elimination
of such barriers as an important objective. 300
3. Market Confidence
An objective of any financial model is the maintenance of market con-
fidence in the financial system. 30 1 The need for confidence is of utmost
importance in relation to the securities sector. Relevant rules and operat-
(CFTC), the United Kingdom Department for International Development,
(DFID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the OECS. Herbert
has also been an Associate Tutor in legislative drafting at the Hugh Wooding Law
School.
297. See generally World Bank Report, supra note 75; Ruth de Krivoy, The Venezuelan
Banking Crisis, in FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE 1990s 151 (Douglas Arner et al. eds.,
2002).
298. For a general discussion of the importance of the financial sector in this regard, see
generally GEORGE A. WALKER, EUROPEAN BANKING LAW: POLICY AND PRO-
GRAMME CONSTRUCTION 6-13 (2007).
299. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
300. Id.
301. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, ch. 8, § 3(l), (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga-20000008-en-1 [hereinafter FMSA].
For a discussion of this objective in the context of the U.K. model, see generally
MICHAEL BLAIR ET AL., BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES &
MARKETS ACT 2000 25-28 (2001).
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ing procedures must then be "fair, efficient and transparent. '302
Market confidence is an important objective and must be included in
the proposed CARICOM model.30 3 This approach should incorporate an
extended definition to include financial stability as an integral component
of market confidence. This approach will also require preserving actual
system stability, as well as taking measures that can instill a reasonable
expectation of system stability in market participants. 30 4
4. Public Awareness and Consumer Protection
Public awareness has to be secured by measures that promote "public
understanding of the financial system. ' 305 This includes both "awareness
of the benefits and risks associated with different kinds of investment or
other financial dealing; and the provision of appropriate information and
advice. ' 30 6 Consumer protection, on the other hand, generally refers to
"securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers. '"307
These objectives have been considered important for correcting the im-
balance of information between producers and consumers of financial
services. 30 8 They are important objectives under the U.K. mode 30 9 and
should be adopted for inclusion in the proposed CARICOM model.3 10
5. Reduction of Financial Crime
The reduction of financial crime is an increasingly important concern
for financial systems. 311 This reduction is a key objective in the United
Kingdom, where it means "reducing the extent to which it is possible for
a business carried on by a regulated person ... to be used for a purpose
connected with financial crime. ' 312 A financial crime has then been de-
fined to include "misconduct in, or misuse of information relating to, a
financial market .... ,,313
The reduction of financial crime is considered to have important links
to prudential issues, in particular with the adequacy of systems and con-
trols, as well as money laundering. 31 4 Reducing financial crime is an im-
302. Id.
303. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
304. For a discussion on the merits of this approach, see generally Walker, Capital Re-
form, Financial Services and Single Markets, supra note 187.
305. See FSMA, supra note 301, § 4(1).
306. Id. § 4(2).
307. Id. § 5(1).
308. See generally BLAIR, supra note 301, at 28-29; Walker, Capital Reform, Financial
Services and Single Markets, supra note 187.
309. BLAIR, supra note 301, at 28-34.
310. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
311. See generally COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING
AND TERRORIST FINANCING: A MODEL OF BEST PRACTICE FOR THE FINANCIAL
SECrOR, THE PROFESSIONS AND OTHER DESIGNATED BUSINESSES, chs. 1 & 2 (2nd
ed. 2006).
312. See FSMA, supra note 301, § 6(1).
313. For a definition of "financial crime" in the U.K., see id. § 6(3).
314. See generally BLAIR, supra note 301, at 34.
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portant component in attempts to secure public confidence in institutions
and the financial system in general. 31 5 While these conclusions were de-
rived elsewhere, similar considerations would apply in CARICOM and a
U.K.-type objective should be adopted for inclusion in the proposed new
CARICOM model.
6. Implementation and Enforcement
While the harmonization of financial laws is critical, "there is more to
creating an integrated financial market than regulatory harmonisa-
tion. ' '316 Policymakers must ensure that once an appropriate financial re-
gime has been established, there is a subsequent shift away from devising
legislation to implementation and enforcement. 317 This would need to be
supported by a common region-wide culture of supervision. 318
Although the European Union (EU), for example, has devised various
financial laws for region-wide application, in practice there has been an
unfortunate lag in implementation. 31 9 There are significant variances in
regulatory culture across the EU, which has been a deterrent to the crea-
tion of an integrated financial market. 320 Against this background, Sir
Howard Davies, in considering EU particularities, has nevertheless con-
cluded that financial market integration has the capacity to generate sig-
nificant economic gains.321
7. Ongoing Review and Corrective Adjustments
While initial model selection is critical, adequate provisions for ongoing
review and corrective adjustment, where required, should be considered
to be even more important in devising the proposed new CARICOM
315. Id.
316. See generally Howard Davies, Dir. of the London Sch. of Econ. & Political Sci.,
Speech Delivered at the Reykjavik, Iceland Conference: The European Single Fi-





319. In the words of Sir Howard, "there is plenty of legislation in place which has not so
far been implemented in practice." Id. at 9.
320. Id.
321. Id.; see generally COMM. OF WISE MEN, supra note 185; Willem F. Duisenberg,
President of the European Cent. Bank, Speech Delivered at "The Single Financial
Market: Two Years into EMU" Economics Conference: The Role of Financial
Markets for Economic Growth (May 31, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.
bis.org/review/rOl060lb.pdf). For a Caribbean view on the possible benefits of fi-
nancial integration, see THE CARIBBEAN TRADE AND ADJUSTMENT GROUP, IM-
PROVING COMPETITIVENESS FOR CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT 28 (2001). The
report concluded that, with effective financial market integration, "[m]ore cost ef-
fective cross-border supply of services should be positively encouraged." See also
Christopher P. Malcolm, Financial Harmonisation in the OECS: Implications for
Integrated Development in CARICOM, in PRODUCTION INTEGRATION IN CAR-
ICOM: From Theory to Action 183 (Denis Benn & Kenneth Hall eds., 2006);
Brown, supra note 246, at 176.




The authorization (including exemption) provisions of any financial
model are intended to establish the basis upon which a person may be-
come involved as a provider of financial services as well as a person's
associated rights and obligations. 323 The proposed CARICOM model
will have to include relevant provisions to determine how a person may
qualify for authorization and how it may end,324 passport rights for cross-
border service providers, 325 and the granting of exemptions.326 In addi-
tion, the new model must also include corollary permission provisions
with a distinct application procedure. 327
These provisions have been adopted from the U.K. model. While this
model is not regional, it nevertheless provides some guidance for market
integration because the model incorporates EU directives dealing with
cross-border service providers, 328 as well as relevant establishment and
general service provision treaty rights. 329 The U.K. model has also estab-
lished threshold conditions related to legal status, 330 the location of of-
fices,33 1 close links,332 adequate resources, 333 suitability, 334 and the
protection of consumers. 335 These have been considered appropriate
threshold standards and, therefore, should be adopted for inclusion in the
proposed CARICOM model.336
322. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
323. See generally BLAIR, supra note 301, at 72.
324. See generally Annex, supra note 3. For a comparison to the U.K. approach, see
FSMA, supra note 301, § 31 (setting out the four possible routes to authorization).
325. See generally Annex, supra note 3; FSMA, supra note 301, sched. 3 (giving effect in
U.K. law to European single markets in banking, investment services, and insur-
ance). The provisions under the U.K. model are based on a mutual recognition
regime, as compared to the ICFS, where full harmonization supported by uniform
legislation is the integrating principle relied upon.
326. See generally Annex, supra note 3; FSMA, supra note 301, §§ 38, 39 (providing the
power to make exemption orders and exemptions for appointed representatives).
327. See generally Annex, supra note 3; FSMA, supra note 301, pt. IV. The U.K. ap-
proach has been considered to be an important component of its single integrated
regime. See generally BLAIR, supra note 301, at 83].
328. BLAIR, supra note 301, at 5-79; see also Revised Treaty supra note 252.
329. See generally FSMA, supra note 301, sched. 4. The rights of establishment and
cross-border provision of services have been established under articles 43 to 55 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community and go beyond the passport
rights covered by schedule 3 of the FSMA.




334. Id. 5; see also FSMA, supra note 301, § 49(1).
335. Id. § 41(3).
336. For a discussion of these requirements in the context of the UK, see generally
BLAIR, supra note 301, at 86-88.
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C. REGULATION
The establishment of an appropriate regulatory regime is a required
component of any financial model. 337 While this is generally accepted,
the framework within which it operates has been subject to various theo-
retical and practical approaches. 338
The proposed CARICOM model will require the establishment of a
single financial regulator for CARICOM having a proper balance be-
tween independence on the one hand and accountability on the other.
Ensuring this balance is complicated and has proved to be one of the
most complicated aspects of the U.K. Financial Services and Markets Act
(FMSA).339 Nevertheless, the guiding principles to be adopted under the
proposed model will be derived mainly from the U.K. model. 340
The CARICOM regulator will have overall responsibility for 1) the ef-
337. For a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation, see generally CHARLES
GOODHART ET AL, FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE NOW?
(Routledge 1998); see also generally ROBERT BALDWIN AND MARTIN CAVE UN-
DERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY AND PRACTICE 9-17 (OUP
1999).
338. Id.
339. See generally BLAIR, supra note 301, at 20. The accountability provisions in the
United Kingdom reflect the traditional constitutional doctrine that incorporated
bodies should not be directly answerable to Parliament. The primary line of ac-
countability has therefore been through Her Majesty's Treasury. The FMSA holds
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) accountable by: (1) power of appointment
and dismissal of the board and chairman [sched. 1, 9 2(3)]; (2) requiring that a
report be submitted to the Treasury at least once per year covering prescribed
matters accompanied by a report from the non-executive directors [sched. 1, $
10(2)] and will be laid before Parliament [sched. 1, T 10(2)]; (3) its capacity to
commission reviews and enquiries into aspects the FSA's operations [§§ 12-18];
and (4) the Treasury' approval is required for the appointment or dismissal of
chairmen of the Consumer and Practitioner Panels. FMSA, supra note 301,
§§ 9(3), 10(3). In addition, a majority of the members of the governing body of
the FSA shall be non-executive. Id. sched. 1, $ 3(1)(a). The FSA shall hold an
annual public meeting open to any interested parties within three months of the
report required under schedule 1, paragraph 10. This is intended to facilitate a
general discussion of the report's contents as well as to provide an opportunity for
questions about the acts or omissions of the FSA in the discharge of its functions.
Id. sched. 1, 9 11(2). Judicial review and scrutiny is another accountability mecha-
nism. The independence provisions include immunity from suit for all acts, except
those taken in bad faith or in breach of the Human Rights Act 1998. Id. sched. 1, $
19. But, the FSA has been required to establish a scheme for dealing with com-
plaints arising from the discharge of or failure to discharge its functions]. Id.
sched. 1, $ 7. The Act also provides for an investigator who can act independently
of the FSA [sched. 1, $ 7(b)] and confers authority on him to recommend compen-
sation to a justified complainant. Id. sched. 1, $ 8(5). Alan Greenspan, then
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States, has argued that "[a
monopoly regulator for the entire financial sector in the United States] is highly
undesirable on both political and economic grounds." See generally Alan Green-
span, Financial Innovations and Supervision of Financial Institutions, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE 31ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND
COMPETITION 1-6 (1995). While Greenspan's observations may be well-founded in
the constitutional context of the United States, a multiple-regulators approach has
not been considered most appropriate for implementation in CARICOM. Instead,
a variant of the single-regulator approach adopted in the United Kingdom has
been preferred.
340. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
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ficient and economic allocation of resources; 341 2) securing a supervisory
regime in which sound corporate governance is considered to be the first
and most important protection for investors and consumers alike; 342 3)
ensuring that measures adopted are proportionate to the benefits that are
expected to be derived; 343 4) "facilitating innovation in connection with
regulated activities"; 344 5) seeking to establish and maintain an interna-
tionally competitive financial sector in CARICOM;345 6) ensuring appro-
priate arrangements for and observance of relevant standards in the
supply of cross-border financial services;346 and 7) minimizing the possi-
ble adverse impact of regulation on financial institutions and the services
they provide. 347
While these principles could receive unanimous policy support, it will
still be difficult to secure the implementation of a single financial regula-
tor for CARICOM. Initial resistance could be based on a lack of political
will or the unwillingness of existing regulators to surrender their control
and bureaucratic prestige.348 The establishment of a single regulator will
also require fundamental and far-reaching regime change, and this could
militate against establishing a single regulator in the short term.
Against this background, it is necessary to suggest an alternative ap-
proach to be devised for implementation. This will involve establishing a
well-considered mutual recognition regime based upon agreed minimum
standards and the incorporation of existing regulators. 349 While this ap-
341. For an example of how this has been dealt with in the United Kingdom, see
FSMA, supra note 301, § 2(3)(a). The FSA has sought to develop a risk-based
approach to regulation, in which resources are allocated according to institutions
and sectors that pose the greatest risk to consumers and the financial system more
generally See generally BLAIR, supra note 301, at 35.
342. For an example of how this has been dealt with in the United Kingdom, see
FSMA, supra note 301, § 2(3)(b). For a discussion on the importance of this prin-
ciple, see generally BLAIR, supra note 301, at 35. The authors conclude that "[n]o
supervision, however effective, could - or should - ever replace sound manage-
ment in a firm."
343. For an example of how this has been dealt in the United Kingdom, see FSMA,
supra note 301, § 2(3)(c). In the United Kingdom, a cost/benefit analysis approach
has been adopted. There are still, however, serious conceptual difficulties to be
resolved before this can become a reliable principle for regulation. Nevertheless,
the general concern that regulatory measures should match their anticipated out-
come appears to be well-founded. See generally BLAIR, supra note 301, at 35.
344. For an example of how this has been dealt with in the United Kingdom, see
FSMA, supra note 301, § 2(3)(d).
345. For an example of how this has been dealt with in the United Kingdom, see
FSMA, supra note 301, § 2(3)(e), (g).
346. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
347. For an example of how this has been dealt with in the United Kingdom, see
FSMA, supra note 301, § 2(3)(f).
348. See generally Steve H. Hanke & Kurt Schuler, ALTERNATIVE MONETARY RE-
GIMES FOR JAMAICA (Aug. 1995), available at http://www.psoj.org/hanke.pdf.
349. Mutual recognition allows regulators in one jurisdiction to rely on the regulatory
standards and conduct of their counterparts in another. Under this system, regula-
tors need not operate from precisely the same rules in precisely the same way. But
there has to be a compatible and broadly similar regulatory framework in which
broadly similar tasks are carried out. The system is therefore complimented by
minimum harmonization with this requirement in mind.
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proach may be acceptable to regional policymakers and easier to imple-
ment in the short-term, a single regulator is a better integrating option for
CARICOM. Therefore, the establishment of a single regulator should be
included in the proposed model as a standard to be reached.
D. SUPERVISION
An effective supervisory regime must be able to detect and take neces-
sary corrective measures to improve weaknesses in the financial sector
that could threaten stability within and outside the regime's territory. 350
The fundamental precepts are maintaining stability and confidence in the
financial system; pursuing market discipline by encouraging good corpo-
rate governance and enhancing market transparency and surveillance;
having operational independence-the means and power to gather infor-
mation and the authority to enforce decisions; understanding the nature
of the financial sector in order to ensure that risks are being adequately
managed; being able to risk profile individual institutions and allocate
resources accordingly; ensuring that financial institutions have adequate
resources, sound management, and effective control systems; and main-
taining close cooperation with other supervisors. 35 1
The need for effective supervision has become even more relevant in
recent years, and the Basel Committee called for action in this domain in
1996.352 Since then, several bodies have been examining ways to
strengthen financial stability around the world, including the Basel Com-
mittee, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Mone-
tary Fund and the World Bank.353
The Basel Committee prepared a comprehensive set of core principles
for effective banking supervision and a supporting compendium (to be
updated periodically) of existing Committee recommendations, guide-
lines, and standards. These were endorsed by the G-10 central bank gov-
ernors and then submitted to the G-7 and G-10 Ministers of Finance in
preparation for the 1997 Denver Summit. The intention of these and sub-
sequent measures, such as the Basel II Capital Accord, is to provide a
useful mechanism for strengthening global financial stability. 354
The core principles comprise essential elements that need to be in place
for an effective supervisory regime. These principles relate to precondi-
tions for effective banking supervision - Principle 1; licensing and struc-
ture - Principles 2 to 5; prudential regulations and requirements -
Principles 6 to 15; information requirements - Principle 21; formal pow-
350. See generally WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION: LAW, POLICY
AND PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 447.
351. Id. at 452-453.
352. See generally ECONOMIC COMMUNIQU8: MAKING SUCCESS OF GLOBALIZATION
FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL, (June 28, 1996), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/
summit/19961yon/communique.html.
353. See generally WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION: LAW, POLICY
AND PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 447-452.
354. Id.
2008]ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS AND AGENDA FOR REFORM 555
ers of supervision - Principle 22; and cross-border banking - Principles 23
to 25.355 While the principles have been devised from a banking perspec-
tive, they establish standards that can be generally adopted for implemen-
tation in the financial sector.
The proposed model must be devised to secure the establishment of a
supervisory mechanism with operational independence and clear respon-
sibilities and objectives. 356 It must be conferred with authority to set li-
censing criteria and reject applications for establishment that do not meet
the required standards; determine prudent and appropriate minimum
capital adequacy requirements and internal policies, practices, and proce-
dures; independently validate information received through on-site or
off-site examination; require that information provided comply with con-
sistent accounting policies and practices; determine and implement ap-
propriate corrective action where required; and establish contact and
information exchange with other supervisors. 357
E. CENTRAL BANK
The proposed model requires the establishment of a single central bank
(CCB) modeled on the ECCB. 358 The CCB will operate as lender of last
resort,359 have responsibility for monetary policy, 360 and have critical in-
put in fiscal policy. 3 6' The ECCB has been successful in the OECS and is
considered appropriate for implementation in CARICOM. 362 Insofar as
the EU is concerned, a community central bank has already been estab-
lished and the EU intends to integrate monetary and fiscal policy.363
The ECCB has its genesis in the Board of Commissioners of Currency
of the British Caribbean Territories (Eastern Group). The Board of
Commissioners of Currency was established in 1951 and became the East-
ern Caribbean Currency Authority (ECCA) in 1965.364 In 1983, the
ECCA was collapsed into the ECCB and given responsibility for the
355. Id.
356. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.; see generally Stanley Fischer, ON THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LENDER
OF LAST RESORT (Jan. 3, 1999), available at "[T]here is no accepted definition of
the term lender of last resort, and there are important disagreements over what the
lender of last resort should do. [However], [t]he lender of last resort... is associ-
ated with the prevention and mitigation of financial crises .... [I]n the domestic
case . . . it is not essential that the lender of last resort be the central bank
.... "http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/speechesl1999/lO0399.htm. Fisher contends:
360. For an example of how this has been dealt with in the OECS, see ECCB Agree-
ment Act, art. 4.
361. Id. art. 37.
362. See generally Hanke & Schuler, supra note 348.
363. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, in BLACKSTONE'S EC
LEGISLATION 2004-2005 pmbl. 90-108 (Nigel Foster ed. 15th ed. 2004); see also
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra
art. 99, at 1-90; see generally Duisenberg, supra note 321.
364. For an historical overview, see generally Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB),
http://www.eccb-centralbank.org.
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maintenance of a common currency and monetary stability. 365 The
ECCB has also been required to promote the economic development of
OECS Member States.366
The capacity of the ECCB to impact the formulation of monetary pol-
icy has been constrained by constitutional impediments. Devaluation of
the currency, for example, requires a unanimous vote and since 1976, the
Eastern Caribbean Dollar (EC$) has been fixed at a parity of EC $2.70 to
U.S. $1.367 The unanimity rule translates to an effective principle of sub-
ordination requiring Member States to subscribe to the policy objectives
of the community. The unanimity rule has been beneficial, and the
ECCB has been able to keep inflation low, maintain the exchange rate,
and ensure that the currency has current account convertibility.
368
The ECCB is both a regulator and a supervisor. 369 But the proposed
CCB will not have a similar role in the financial sector. Instead, it will
operate along lines established for the Bank of England since the enact-
ment of the U.K. FSMA. According to the U.K. FMSA, the Bank of
England is independent from regulation and has primary responsibility
for the conduct of monetary policy.
370
Nevertheless, it will be difficult to secure implementation of the pro-
posed CCB. Initial resistance will likely be influenced by jurisdictional
insularity as much as by other more pragmatic militating factors. These
factors include a possible lack of political will and the inability of individ-
ual countries to have exclusive control over monetary and other aspects
of their fiscal policies. While the ECCB could be adopted for this role, in
addition to jurisdictional and other related militating issues, the ECCB
may also suffer operational difficulties related to the size of the economy
that the ECCB will be required to manage. 37
1
These operational difficulties can be considered by reference to the fol-
lowing example. Jamaica has a population about five times that of the
OECS, and Jamaica's economy is twice as large. Whereas the ECCB has
fewer than 200 employees, the BOJ has a staff of approximately 500 and
thus, a functional merger would be problematic. Notwithstanding these
difficulties, the ECCB has had a better history of performance on a cross-
jurisdictional basis. Therefore, the ECCB is better suited than the BOJ
or any other central bank in the Caribbean region to serve the overall
interest of CARICOM. 372
365. See generally Hanke & Schuler, supra note 348.
366. See ECCB Agreement Act, pmbl..
367. See generally Hanke & Schuler, supra note 348.
368. Id.
369. For an overview of the OECS financial system, including the function of the
ECCB, see generally Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), http://www.eccb-
centralbank.org..
370. See Walker, Capital Reform, Financial Services and Single Markets, supra note
187.
371. See generally Hanke & Schuler, supra note 348.
372. Id.
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Against this background, it is necessary to suggest an alternative cen-
tral bank arrangement for possible implementation. This would necessa-
rily involve a mechanism to secure mutual recognition of regulatory and
supervisory practices across the several jurisdictions of CARICOM.
While the existing central banks could be maintained, a coordinating
mechanism needs to be included to provide necessary support and re-
quired information sharing capacity. This could be adopted from the
FRC framework that has already been established in Jamaica. 373
This alternative central bank arrangement would be better able to navi-
gate jurisdictional sensitivities and could then be more attractive to re-
gional policymakers. Nevertheless, a single and independent CCB is a
better integration and economic development option.374 It must there-
fore be introduced under the proposed model as a standard to be
reached, even though it may not be the most viable short-term option for
implementation.
F. ENFORCEMENT
Appropriate enforcement provisions must be introduced with to secure
national policy and commitment to the ICFS in practice, an effective re-
gime for free movement, and a graduated scheme for the settlement of
disputes in which Member States, as well as individuals, can repose
confidence. 375
While a doctrine of direct effect has not, to date, been practiced under
the Revised Treaty, this will have to become a critical component of the
CARICOM regime going forward if its general integration objectives are
to be realized. 376 This will assist any attempt by CARICOM to evolve
from being merely another international organization to becoming a su-
pranational system of governance and ultimately, a more efficient frame-
work for regional integration and economic development. 377 In the
interim, however, provisions for enforcement under the proposed model
must be devised to require (and will not be able to function effectively
373. For a discussion of the Jamaican financial regulatory framework, including how the
FRC works, see generally Christopher P. Malcolm 'Re-thinking the Frameork for
Regulation of the Jamaican Financial Sector' (2004) 5 JIBR 4, 297. Article 26 of
the Revised Treaty also requires a consultation process that could be adapted for
this purpose. See Revised Treaty, supra note 252, art. 26.
374. For a more comprehensive central bank discussion dealing with the principle of
independence, see generally ROSA M. LASTRA CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING
REGULATION, 10-12 (LSE Financial Markets Group 1996).
375. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
376. As practiced in the EU, the doctrine of direct effect enables an individual to seek
remedy for a breach of his rights under Community law in a domestic Court. See
generally TAKIS TRIDAMIS, The General Principles of EU Law ch. 9 (2nd ed. 2006).
With CARICOM, however, this is problematic for two main reasons. First, unlike
the EU, CARICOM does not incorporate a supranational system of governance.
Second, there is no corpus of law as such that can now be properly referred to as
CARICOM law. See generally DUKE E. POLLARD, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE: CLOSING THE CIRCLE OF INDEPENDENCE 6-7 (2004).
377. POLLARD, supra note 376, at 7.
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without) commitment to an underlying doctrine of direct effect.378
The graduated scheme for the settlement of disputes is very important
and includes both administrative mechanisms and judicial proceedings.
While the administrative mechanisms must deal in particular with con-
cerns between the regulator and regulated institutions, the judicial pro-
ceedings, including proceedings at the Caribbean Court of Justice in
particular, will be available to ensure that rights conferred and obliga-




The effective implementation of the proposed model will require une-
quivocal support at the community level and even more importantly, at
national levels. With this in mind, the Agreement and supporting legisla-
tion must be enacted as domestic law with an effective sanctions mecha-
nism in place for noncompliance, rules-based prudential or national
interest reasons, lack of domestic policy, or support.380
The implementation provisions must therefore be able to secure opti-
mal domestic support under a seamless arrangement. 381 These provisions
will not, without more, ensure a viable regional financial sector. To
achieve this, policymakers, as well as industry participants and individuals
in general, will have to be vigilant and make use of available enforcement
procedures.
H. ONGOING REVIEW AND CORRECTIVE ADJUSTMENT
Appropriate provisions dealing with ongoing review and corrective ad-
justment must be included under the proposed model to accommodate
necessary change without bureaucratic hindrance. 382 These measures are
consistent with an overall desire to ensure that potential systemic or other
risks to the financial sector are detected and dealt with apace. In the
United States, for example, the model includes carefully calibrated risk
parameters that inform of potential liquidity problems and then provide
support as necessary. 383
While such or similar measures would have almost universal support,
there is nevertheless an ongoing debate as to whether they should be
based on discretion or rules.384 But, as concluded by Guira: "The answer
378. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
379. Id.
380. This approach has been adopted with success in the OECS where the Agreement
Establishing the ECCB and uniform financial laws have been enacted as domestic
legislation in participating Member States.
381. See generally Annex, supra note 3.
382. Id.
383. See generally Ricki T. Heifer, Rules and Discretionary Power in Relation to Troub-
led Banks: Case Studies - United States, in REFORM OF LATIN AMERICAN BANK-
ING SYSTEMS (Ernesto Aguire & Joseph Norton eds., 2000).
384. See generally Jorge Guira, Mercusor: Trade and Investments Amid Financial Crisis
254 (2003).
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is probably less important than providing some form of external bank
[financial sector] oversight for bank [financial] institutions so that super-
visory agencies can identify the specific problem early and respond
quickly. '385 In practice, this is difficult to achieve because the financial
sector is fast-moving and such measures would require, for example, so-
phisticated computer systems and highly skilled personnel that may not
be available. 38 6 Nevertheless, a well considered mechanism for ongoing
review and corrective adjustment must be included in any new and com-
prehensive CARICOM financial model.
VII. CLOSING COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
With the implementation of the proposed model (ICFS), CARICOM
will be in a better position to secure a viable regional financial sector that
will become a critical supporting component for the more general inte-
gration objectives of the CSME. Implementation could be a slow-moving
process. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the ICFS will ultimately result
in far-reaching policy and institutional transformation for individual
Member States and for CARICOM as a whole.
The ICFS will require the harmonization of financial laws and is in-
tended to become the foundation upon which a viable CSME can be es-
tablished.387 It has been set against a background that includes five
distinct financial regulatory regimes and a CARICOM process that has
already produced a draft financial services agreement (CFSA).
The CFSA is inadequate and unable to support the establishment of an
integrated CARICOM financial market. The actual, as distinct from in-
tended, scope and coverage of the CFSA will not affect the cross-border
supply of banking business. Furthermore, the CFSA's market access, in-
traregional trade, cross-border supervision, prudential requirements,
mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance, transparency and dis-
pute settlement provisions lack sufficient details and do not provide suffi-
cient guidance for national authorities, service providers, or sector
participants more generally.
With this in mind, the construction of the ICFS within the guidelines
proposed in the Annex is a necessary alternative. The Annex is intended
to fill gaps that exist in the CFSA and to establish a forward thinking
model with appropriate provisions for ongoing evaluation and corrective
adjustment where required. The Annex has been influenced by and
many of its provisions have been adopted from the United Kingdom.,
Jamaica, and OECS financial models. The ICFS has also sought to incor-
porate relevant principles devised under the Basel and other internation-
ally accepted initiatives.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 257.
387. For a discussion of the intricate link between financial harmonization and the es-
tablishment of an integrated financial market, see generally COMM. OF WISE MEN,
supra note 185; Davies, supra note 316.
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The ICFS is still a work in progress and other Caribbean experiences
will have to be analyzed and, where appropriate, provided for under a
final model for implementation. For example, details included in the Bar-
bados and Trinidad and Tobago models will have to be evaluated to de-
termine their implications for the proposed ICFS. The relevant
policymakers must also understand that such an arrangement could re-
quire domestic concessions in support of regional objectives. Therefore,
policymakers will be expected to act accordingly.
Fortunately, the ICFS will be implemented under a CSME process that
is not set in stone. As circumstances require, appropriate changes, in-
cluding revised implementation strategies, will have to be made to the
basic CSME framework. 388 With this in mind, it is anticipated that the
proposed model will become part of an overall new and more compre-
hensive CARICOM strategy based upon well-considered detailed ar-
rangements for the financial sector and other sectors.
VIII. ANNEX
ELEMENTS THAT ARE TO BE CONSIDERED IN DRAFTING INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE PREPARATION OF AN AGREEMENT AND SUPPORTING LEGISLA-
TION TO ESTABLISH AN INTEGRATED CARICOM FINANCIAL SECTOR
(ICFS).
1. Under the Revised Treaty, the establishment of a single, integrated
regional financial sector is the responsibility of the Council for Fi-
nance and Planning (COFAP), which is an organ of CARICOM sub-
ject to ultimate control by the Conference of Heads of Government
(CHG) and has primary responsibility for economic policy coordina-
tion, as well as financial and monetary integration within the CSME.
It is to be assisted in this exercise by the Committee of Central Bank
Governors (CCBG), which is a body of CARICOM accountable to
COFAP. (Art 14).
2. The design will require the establishment of a homogenous and
integrated financial services and markets for banking, insurance and
securities in CARICOM. This is to be achieved through a single,
independent and autonomous CARICOM Central Bank (CCB) with
responsibility for the management of monetary policy and a common
currency and having as well a critical role in fiscal policy develop-
ment and management. It will be complemented by a single, inde-
pendent and autonomous CARICOM Financial Services
Commission (CFSC) with responsibility for the regulation and super-
vision of the entire financial sector (banking, insurance and securities
services and markets).
3. This approach to the regional financial sector, supported by uni-
form legislation under a full integration model (covers the entire fi-
nancial sector, includes full regulatory and supervisory details,
388. See generally Edward Green, Striving Toward a Regional Reconfiguration of a Ra-
tional Community Through Shared Sovereignty, in CARIBBEAN IMPERATIVES: RE-
GIONAL GOVERNANCE AND INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT 1, 8 (Kenneth Hall &
Denis Benn eds., 2005).
2008]ESSENTIAL PROVISIONS AND AGENDA FOR REFORM 561
establishes single institution/agency arrangement, requires consistent
cross-jurisdictional adoption and application of essential measures),
is to be preferred to a mutual recognition model (requires minimum
harmonization based on the adoption of core principles, national
agencies work together through common understanding and respect
for the validity and effectiveness of each others laws, manage rela-
tionships under Memoranda of Understanding) since it will more
likely secure the implementation of a common regime in every Par-
ticipating Member State as well as reduce the uneven application of
agreed regulatory standards and market conduct oversight.
4. The new institutions being proposed will create an overarching
structure operating at the regional level as well as in the financial
systems of individual Member States. The current central banks as
well as other regulatory and supervisory arrangements will be re-
quired to cede ultimate authority to these new institutions. They will
then have functional powers to manage monetary and aspects of fis-
cal policy as well as to regulate and supervise the financial sector
delegated back to them within a prescribed policy framework under
the auspices of COFAP.
5. The establishment of this new infrastructure will build on the insti-
tutional/administrative model that has been operating under the
Agreement establishing the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
(ECCB) and implementing legislation since 1983. The ECCB model
has been effectively implemented in the OECS and successfully re-
lied upon by its Participating Member States (Antigua and Barbuda,
the Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Chris-
topher and Nevis (St. Kitts and Nevis), Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines) as manifest through stable macro-economic
management of small and vulnerable economies in a volatile eco-
nomic environment.
6. The ECCB was established in 1983 to: (a) issue and manage a
common currency; (b) safeguard the international value of the cur-
rency; (c) promote monetary stability and a sound financial struc-
ture; and (d) to further the economic development of Participating
States (ECCB Agreement Act Preamble & art 4). It is banker, fiscal
agent of, and advisor to, the Participating Governments and is the
depository of their funds (Art 37).
7. Under the current arrangement, the ECCB is also the regulator
and supervisor of financial institutions in the OECS. There is a la-
cuna in that the insurance sector has not been operating under uni-
form legislation, as is the case for banking and securities, and is not
now subject to regulation and supervision by the ECCB. While this
may have worked in the context of the OECS, the proposed new
model must include an appropriate regulatory and supervisory
framework for the insurance sector and it is intended that central
banking will be separated from regulation and supervision as hap-
pened when the Financial Services Authority (FSA) was established
in the UK in 2000.
8. The UK financial system now includes the Bank of England
(BOE) which has responsibility for monetary policy and a role in
fiscal policy and the FSA which is a single regulator for the entire
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financial sector (services and markets) operating under omnibus leg-
islation including single regulations.
9. The current UK approach contrasts with the U.S. approach which
is based on multiplicity of relevant regulatory legislation and multi-
ple regulators. The U.S. approach emphasizes a functional theory of
regulation under which financial institutions are licensed to carry out
specific functions and are then regulated and supervised by special-
ists based on the functions they perform.
10. The proposed new approach for CARICOM will incorporate, by
treaty, a single regulator model in the vein of the UK FSA. It will as
well incorporate a single central bank based on the underlying cen-
tral bank functions - less regulatory and supervisory roles - of the
ECCB.
11. The proposed CARICOM Central Bank (CCB) will be estab-
lished as the central bank of all the Participating States of CAR-
ICOM, including those now served by the ECCB. Accordingly, it is
anticipated that the new Agreement will replace or amend the
ECCB Agreement Act as well as the relevant central bank Acts in
every other Participating Member State. Like the ECCB, the CCB
shall be banker, fiscal agent of, and advisor to the Governments as
well as a depository of their funds.
12. It will have overarching authority for the control of monetary
policy and serve as lender of last resort. But, it will have no day to
day involvement in the regulation or supervision of any part of the
financial sector (services or markets) in Participating Member States.
This will be the preserve of the proposed new single CARICOM reg-
ulator (CFSC) and its agents.
13. The existing Central Banks will continue to function as the agents
of the new CCB under special arrangement such as perhaps by an
MOU endorsed under the Treaty. This should establish the relation-
ship of the central banks to the CCB very clearly and provide that in
the event of a conflict, the policies and directives of the CCB will
prevail to the extent of any inconsistency.
14. The proposed structure to be reflected in the treaty for the estab-
lishment of a single financial space or integrated financial services
and markets will also include a CARICOM Financial Services Com-
mission (CFSC) as a single regulator for the entire financial sector
(services and markets). It will accord with the approach of the UK
FSA and is also consistent with the underlying single regulator phi-
losophy that justified the establishment of the Jamaican FSC.
15. In developing a framework for regulating and supervising finan-
cial services and markets in the CSME, the models developed under
the Financial Services Commission Act (FSCA) of Jamaica as well as
under the UK Financial Services and Markets Act should provide
guidance as to detail. In addition, the international standards devel-
oped, for example, under the Basel Initiative are also to be
considered.
16. In considering these models, it is noted that the Jamaican FSC is
a single regulator for non-deposit taking financial institutions while
the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) has responsibility for the regulation and
supervision of deposit taking financial institutions. The underlying
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philosophy that justified the establishment of the FSC was based on
similar arguments to those that justified the establishment of the UK
FSA. Relying on the same arguments the BOJ should have then
been stripped of its financial regulatory and supervisory responsibili-
ties by consequential amendment to the relevant legislation such as
the Bank of Jamaica Act, the Banking Act, the Financial Institutions
Act and now the Financial Services Commission Act.
17. In designing the ICFS, the following are some of the questions
that will require careful consideration. The answers should deter-
mine the policy, design and detail. The content in brackets suggests
outline answers as well as sources for guidance.
(a) How will financial activities, products, services and markets as
well as central bank and regulatory concepts and applicable rela-
tionships be determined under the proposed ICFS? [These will be
specified in the treaty and supporting legislation. Guidance may be
sought from the Revised Treaty, the Draft CARICOM Financial
Services Agreement, the ECCB Agreement Act, the Jamaican Fi-
nancial Services Commission Act and the UK Financial Services
and Markets Act.]
(b) What is intended to be achieved under the ICFS? [The in-
tended outcome is the implementation of a single CARICOM fi-
nancial sector under the CSME so as to promote the attainment of
the regional integration and economic development objectives,
which have been agreed since the Grand Anse Declaration of
1989.]
(c) Why should this intended outcome be achieved? [Regional in-
tegration is viewed as an imperative for the survival of Caribbean
economies. The ICFS should become a critical driver for Carib-
bean integration and economic development and should be re-
garded as analogous and complementary to the CCJ without which
the desired objectives of the CSME cannot be attained.]
(d) When is the intended outcome to be achieved? [Financial inte-
gration requires urgent attention since it is a major operational
component of the CSME.]
(e) What is the authority for the intended outcome? [Through
COFAP under Article 14 of the Revised Treaty, the proposed new
framework should accord with Chapter Three of the Revised
Treaty. It will therefore treat with: prohibition of new restrictions
on the provision of services (Art 36); removal of restrictions on
provision of services (Art 37); removal of restrictions on banking
insurance and other financial services (Art 38); prohibition of new
restrictions on movement of capital and current transactions (Art
39); removal restrictions on movement of capital and current
transactions (Art 40); authorization to facilitate movement of capi-
tal (Art 41); coordination of foreign exchange policies and ex-
change of information (Art 42); restrictions to safeguard balance-
of-payments (Art 43); measures to facilitate establishment, provi-
sion of services and movement of capital (Art 44); and movement
of Community Nationals (Arts 45 & 46).]
(f) Who are the critical persons to be involved if the intended out-
come of financial integration is to be achieved? [The Heads of
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Government, COFAP, Central Bank Governors, Financial Regu-
lators, Financial Institutions as well as relevant Associations, such
as Bankers' Associations and Securities Dealers' Associations, and
other bodies, such as Basel Committee and IOSCO.]
(g) How will the ICFSM be implemented? [This will be under a
single treaty identifying the roles and functions of key partners.
COFAP will need to secure corrective adjustment through a direc-
tives mechanism as obtains in the EU with critical interpretation
and application support from the CCJ.]
(h) What are the likely constitutional or other impediments? [An-
ticipated resistance will come from existing central banks and reg-
ulatory authorities. The challenges may well be inadequate or lack
of political support for implementation.]
(i) How will these be resolved? [The Agreement to be signed by
the Heads will include clear directions that will deal with the antic-
ipated resistance from the functionaries (central banks and regula-
tory authorities). In addition, an extensive education program and
consensus-building exercise will have to be pursued at both the
national and regional levels in accordance with the consultation
requirement of Article 26 of the Revised Treaty.]
(j) How will the arrangement be funded? [Initial set-up costs
could be funded from budgetary or other allocations by the Partic-
ipating States. This will involve the establishment of a trust fund
as has been the case with the CCJ (Revised Agreement Establish-
ing the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund). Thereafter, the
recurrent expenditure will be met from this Fund as well as
through user fees and fines, fixed according to policy by COFAP
and from local regulators, collected from licensees.]
(k) How will accountability be secured? [The ICFSM should in-
clude an autonomous audit function comprising independent audi-
tors having necessary job security and with reporting obligations to
the Heads of Government. Their reports will be made public.
Guidance on the establishment of this mechanism may be sought
from the EU (EC Treaty arts 246-248; Charter of the Internal Au-
dit Services of the European Commission <http://ec.europa.ed/dgs/
internalaudit/docs/chartersen.pdf>]
(1) How will the directors/managers/other personnel be chosen?
[The Treaty will specify the relevant appointing authority and prin-
ciples governing the process.]
(m) By reference to what criteria and for what functions? [The
treaty should specify that the persons appointed to serve either
institution as directors or in other senior management positions
will be persons of recognized standing and having relevant experi-
ence. Guidance for the CCB may be sought from the ECCB
Agreement Act Part IV. For the CFSC, guidance should be
sought from the Jamaican FSCA First Schedule.]
(n) How will disputes be resolved? [Disputes involving the Mem-
ber States will be resolved in accordance with the procedure estab-
lished under Chapter Nine of the Revised Treaty in compliance
with the Revised Treaty. Other disputes, involving regulated enti-
ties or the CFSC and such entities, will be resolved also in accor-
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dance with this procedure and such other procedures adopted by
the CFSC from time to time within policy guidelines prescribed by
COFAP. Guidance on establishing an appeals process from deci-
sions of the CFSC may be sought from the Jamaican FSCA Second
Schedule.]
(o) How will enforcement be secured? [Enforcement will be se-
cured, where necessary, through the CCJ. In addition, the CFSC
will be able to apply administrative or other remedies, such as
naming and shaming, fines, suspension of and termination of li-
censes against regulated entities that are in breach of their obliga-
tions. Guidance on this aspect - administrative or other remedies
- may be sought from the UK FSMA Part XIV and the Jamaican
FSCA Third Schedule.]
(p) How will the ICFSMA be implemented? [The treaty should be
incorporated into the domestic law of each Member State. Gui-
dance on this aspect may be sought from the ECCB Agreement
Act Part XIV.]
(q) Insofar as the CCB is concerned, how will it be established?
[It will be established as a body corporate having perpetual succes-
sion under the authority of COFAP with specific powers and pur-
poses that accord with the Agreement of the Heads. Guidance on
this aspect may be sought from the ECCB Agreement Act Part
XIV.]
(r) How will it manage general reserves and profits? [The CCB
will establish and manage general reserves from its operating reve-
nues and determine profits that will then be shared in accordance
with an established formula. Guidance on this aspect may be
sought from the ECCB Agreement Act Part III & Annex I.]
(s) How will it manage the currency and external reserves? [The
CCB will issue and monitor use of the uniform currency once it
has been agreed. It will also maintain an External Reserve on
terms and conditions determined by COFAP. Guidance on this
aspect may be sought from the ECCB Agreement Act Parts V &
VI.]
(t) How will it manage foreign exchange operations? [The CCB
will be the depository of the external assets of the Participating
Governments and will by itself as well through its designated
agents be able to trade in foreign currency on their behalf. Gui-
dance may be sought from the ECCB Agreement Act Part VII.]
(u) How will it be able to promote monetary stability and sound
financial management as well as further economic development in
the territories of the Participating Governments? [The CCB will
have an integral role in economic policy development through
COFAP. It will be required to apply best economic management
practice within the agreed policy framework.]
(v) How will it relate to financial institutions? [The CCB will be
able to open accounts for and accept deposits from financial insti-
tutions operating in Participating Member States. It will also serve
as lender of last resort to banks. Guidance on this aspect may be
sought from the ECCB Agreement Act Part VIII.]
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(w) How will it relate to the CFSC? [The CCB will have regular
meetings with the CFSC and share relevant information with it in
accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).]
(x) How will it relate with Participating Governments? [The CCB
will be the banker, fiscal agent of, and advisor to the Participating
Governments. Guidance on this aspect may be sought from the
ECCB Agreement Act Part IX.]
(y) How will it relate with existing central banks in CARICOM?
[These will become functional agents operating under its direction
and within a policy framework prescribed by COFAP under the
authority of the Treaty.]
(z) What privileges and immunities will it enjoy? [The CCB will
be accorded such privileges and immunities in the territories of
Participating States as are necessary for it to fulfill its functions.
Guidance on this aspect may be sought from the ECCB Agree-
ment Act Part XII.]
(aa) With whom and on what basis will information be shared?
[Relevant information, including economic policy objectives, fiscal
and monetary targets, currency and reserves, performance of fi-
nancial institutions, regulation, supervision, cross-border access
and control and other operational concerns will be shared with the
Participating Governments, the CFSC, Central Bank Agents and
other interested parties. Information sharing will be coordinated
through COFAP. Guidance on this aspect may be sought from the
Jamaican FSCA ss 15 & 16.]
(bb) What are the conditions for withdrawal and termination? [A
Participating Government will be able to withdraw from the CCB
by an established notice procedure and its operations can be ter-
minated in accordance with established procedure. Guidance on
this aspect may be sought for the ECCB Agreement Act Part
XIII.]
(cc) Insofar as the CFSC is concerned, how will it be established?
[It will be established as a body corporate having perpetual succes-
sion by virtue of the authority of the Treaty. The CFSC will ac-
countable to COFAP Guidance on this aspect may be sought from
the Jamaica FSCA ss 3-9 and the UK FSMA Part I.]
(dd) What authorization criteria will it apply? [The CFSC will be
guided as to what are regulated and prohibited financial activities.
It will be able to authorize the provision of financial services
within CARICOM as well as grant exemptions where appropriate
according to objective criteria. It will also have general power to
make rules that apply to authorized persons and in respect of regu-
lated activities. Guidance on this aspect may be sought from the
UK FSMA Parts II, III & X.]
(ee) How and on what basis will it be able to secure cross-border
access as well as free movement? [This will be achieved by a uni-
form passport rights regime. Guidance on this aspect, by reference
to how the EU regime has been introduced in the UK, may be
sought from UK FSMA Schedule 3. See also generally Lamfa-
lussy Committee Report ch 2.]
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(ff) How will it be able to secure appropriate prudential and con-
duct of business standards and safeguard the domestic and re-
gional economies against financial crises, contagion and systemic
collapse? [The CSFC will be able to issue statements of principle
concerning the performance and market conduct of financial ser-
vices providers as well as establish fit and proper criteria for their
functionaries and prudential requirements that must be met. Gui-
dance on this aspect may be sought from: UK FSMA Parts V-VIII;
Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework; Basel High-Level Prin-
ciples for the cross-border implementation of the New Accord;
Basel Home-host information sharing for effective Basel II imple-
mentation; Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervi-
sion; Basel Core Principles Methodology; ISOCO Core Principles
of Securities Regulation; IAIS Core Insurance Supervisory
Principles.]
(gg) How will it be able to encourage innovation and respond to
the needs of the financial sector in a fast-paced and pro-active
manner as well as contribute to the maintenance of an enabling
environment that will encourage economic expansion and devel-
opment in the territories of the Participating Governments? [The
CFSC will be required to follow principles of good corporate gov-
ernance and will be able to function as an autonomous entity with-
out having to resort to COFAP, except on questions of policy, in
its decision making processes.]
(hh) How will it relate to the CCB? [The CFSC will have regular
meetings with the CCB and share relevant information with it in
accordance with an MOU.]
(ii) How will it relate to Participating Governments? [The CFSC
will have no reporting or other direct obligations to the Participat-
ing Governments.]
(jj) How will it relate with existing regulators in CARICOM?
[These will become functional agents operating under its direction
and within a policy framework prescribed by the Treaty and policy
direction of COFAP].
(kk) How will it relate with relevant international bodies as well as
external regulatory authorities and institutions? [The CFSC will
be able to establish functional relationships with Basel Committee,
IOSCO, IAIS, World Bank, IMF, US Federal Reserve Board, UK
FSA and similar bodies under MoUs where required.]
(11) What privileges and immunities will it enjoy? [The CFSC will
be accorded such privileges and immunities in the territories of
Participating States as are necessary for it to fulfill its functions.
Guidance on this aspect may be sought from the ECCB Agree-
ment Act Part XII and Jamaican FSCA art 22.]
(mm) With whom and on what basis will information be shared?
[Relevant information, including as to economic policy objectives,
fiscal and monetary targets, currency and reserves, performance of
financial institutions, regulation, supervision, cross-border access
and control and other operational concerns will be shared with the
Participating Governments, the CCB, Central Bank Agents and
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other interested parties. Information sharing will be coordinated
through COFAP. Guidance on this aspect may be sought from the
Jamaican Financial Services Commission Act ss 15 & 16.]
(nn) How will it secure compliance? [The CFSC will have the
power to require relevant information from financial institutions
as well as conduct investigations that will enable it to assess their
compliance with or breach of operating requirements. It will also
be able to intervene in and take disciplinary action where neces-
sary. Guidance on this aspect may be sought from the UF FSMA
Parts XI, XII, XIII, XIV & XV and Jamaican FSCA Third
Schedule.]
(oo) How will it secure ongoing review and corrective adjustment?
[Through COFAP and under a directives mechanism as obtains in
the EU.]
(pp) In the transition of this Agreement to legislation, the drafter
will need to be aware of the potential constitutional implications.
